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Introduction
In 1986, Mark Fowler, then Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) chairman, argued together with Albert Halprin and James
Schlichting that local exchange markets would become competitive
due to the potential entry of cable television companies, cellular radio
providers, and interexchange carriers.' Based on this prediction and
other changes in telecommunications markets and technologies, they
called "for a re-examination of government regulation of the telecom-
munications industry in the United States."2
It is now clear that competition for various local exchange carrier
(LEC) services (such as special access, switched access, or Centrex
service) has existed for several years. Competition in local exchange
markets emerged with the appearance of shared tenant services, fiber
optics-based metropolitan area networks, private brand exchanges
(PBXs) used in lieu of LEC central office-based switching services
(e.g., Centrex), alternate operator services, and Centrex resellers. It is
equally clear that the actions of the FCC and various state public util-
ity commissions over the last several years have aimed toward foster-
ing further competition in local exchange telecommunications
markets.
Until recently, most observers considered the provision of basic
local exchange service a bastion of LECs such as Pacific Telesis,
United Telecomm, or GTE. Compelling reasons exist for this. Ask
any residential customer if an alternative to the dialtone service of-
fered by the LEC exists, and an emphatic "no" would be the likely
response.4 In most areas of the United States this still rings true,
though conditions are now in the state of flux envisioned by Fowler,
Halprin, and Schlichting. For example, on January 1, 1995, Rochester,
New York became the first U.S. city in 75 years to allow residents a
1. Mark S. Fowler et al., "Back to the Future": A Model for Telecommunications, 38
FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986). Cf. PETER W. HUBER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE GEO-
DESIC NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1987)
(funded by and prepared for the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice).
2. Fowler et al., supra note 1, at 199.
3. See Alexander C. Larson, Overview, in PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW ANTHOLOGY XVii
(Allison P. Zabriske ed., 1992) (July-Oct.) (describing recent competition policies in
telecommunications).
4. Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division, pointed this out. "Competitive dial tone service is still unusual
for business customers and nonexistent for residential customers. In fact, in many states it
still is illegal to compete with the [Regional Bell Operating Company] in the provision of
dial tone service." Anne K. Bingaman, Promoting Competition in Telecommunications,
Address Before the National Press Club (Feb. 28, 1995), in Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1702, at 313 (Mar. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Bingaman speech].
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choice of local carriers.5 Since then, Rochester Telephone Corpora-
tion has connected its network and customers with those of other
firms offering basic local exchange service.
I.
Background
A. The Market Entry of Alternative Providers of Local Exchange Service
Interexchange carriers (IXCs) and competitive access providers
are now entering local exchange markets normally serviced only by
LECs. In 1994, for example, MCI Communications Corporation
(MCI Comm.) formed MCI Metro, planning to spend $2 billion over
the next several years setting up local networks to bypass LEC basic
local exchange service in twenty major cities. Eventually MCI Metro
will connect large business users directly to its network. Sprint and its
cable TV partners plan to invest $4.4 billion to offer customers wire-
less, local, and long distance telephone services together with cable
TV on one bill.6 MCI Comm. also seeks to offer local telephone ser-
vice in Chicago.7
On April 21, 1994, Teleport Communications Group (TCG) filed
an application with the Washington Utilities and Transportation Com-
mission to offer local telephone service in Seattle.8 Metropolitan Fi-
ber Systems (MFS) Intelenet, Inc. applied to the Texas Public Utility
Commission for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,
requesting "co-carrier" status in Texas. 9 The Wisconsin Public Service
5. Catherine Arnst & Michael Oneal, The New Era Begins in Rochester, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 20, 1995, at 97.
6. Sprint and Cable-TV Partners Plan $4.4 Billion Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1995, at D6.
7. Leslie Cauley & Gautam Naik, MCI Seeks to Offer Local Phone Service, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 3, 1994, at B8 (Midwest ed.).
8. Number Portability Ordered; MFS Wins Right to Compete Against Bell Atlantic in
MD, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 29, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Number Portability].
9. See Application of MFS Intelenet of Texas, Inc. for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity to Operate as a Local Exchange Company in the Areas Served by South-
western Bell Telephone Co. and GTE Southwest, Inc in Harris, Dallas, Collin, Tarrant,
Bexar, Travis, and El Paso Counties. 20 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 1627 (Nov. 4, 1994).
Co-carrier status means a telephone company has status equal to existing LECs, in-
cluding the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) and other independent LECs. It
includes four elements: (1) network interconnection that allows unimpeded transmission of
phone calls between different carriers' networks; (2) assignment of telephone numbers that
competitors of the existing local exchange carriers can issue directly to customers; (3) re-
ciprocal compensation agreements, in which one carrier compensates another for comple-
tion of phone calls on its network; and (4) number portability or the ability of end users to
retain their geographic or non-geographic telephone number when they change their loca-
tion, service provider, or service. Thus, there are three types of portability: location porta-
bility, service provider portability, and service portability. Id. at 1630.
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Commission on August 25, 1994 granted TCG authority (on an in-
terim basis) to offer local services. This allows TCG to provide a
range of competitive local exchange services in the Milwaukee area,
including private line, Centrex, and toll calls within the Local Access
Transport Area (LATA). Additionally, Maryland Public Service
Commission recently approved MFS Intelenet's application to provide
switched local services as a co-carrier in Montgomery County,
Maryland."°
In numerous communities, cable TV companies provide potential
competition to the LECs. The same number of homes (91 million)
passed by a cable network also have a telephone." Fiber optics and
digitalization eliminate the physical and functional differences be-
tween cable TV and telephony. As these technologies converge, at-
tempts by interexchange carriers to create alliances with cable
companies magnify the competitive effects. 2 Currently, several cable
TV companies plan to offer telephony over a cable network. Evi-
dence of this comes from SBC Media Ventures' (SBC's) application
for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity before the Maryland
Public Service Commission (with plans to offer local exchange service
in Montgomery County, Maryland);' 3 Cablevision's plan to offer tele-
phone service on a trial basis in New York City in early 1995;14 and
Time Warner's plan to offer local service in Ohio, to compete with
Rochester Telephone in New York by late 1995,15 and to offer tele-
phone service to businesses in New York City.'6 Additionally,
10. Number Portability, supra note 8, at 4.
11. See Motion of Bell Atlantic Corp., BellSouth Corp., Nynex Corp., and Southwest-
ern Bell Corp. to Vacate the Decree, Appendix Vol. II, Affidavit of George Gilder, United
States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192, (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1994), at 7.
12. John J. Keller, AT&T, Sprint, MCI Each Seek Cable Alliances, WALL ST. J., Sept.
15, 1994, at A3 (Midwest ed.). For example, Sprint Corp., the third-ranking long distance
company, signed a joint venture with Tele-Communications, Inc., Comcast, and Cox Enter-
prises. Mark Levinson with Daniel McGinn, It's Raining Phones, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7,
1994, at 78.
13. In re Investigation by the Commission on Its Own Motion into Legal and Policy
Matters Relevant to the Regulation of Firms, Including Current Telecommunications Prov-
iders and Cable Television Firms, Which May Provide Local Exchange and Exchange Ac-
cess Services in Maryland in the Future, Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case No. 8587, Order No.
71485 (Oct. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Investigation]. This application marked the first time a
Bell company subsidiary sought to provide competitive local exchange service in another
Bell company's region.
14. Cablevision Plans to Offer Customers Phone Service, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1994, at
B8 (Midwest ed.). Already, Cablevision Systems Corp. is providing Long Island business
customers with switched services. Matt Davis, How Will Cable Companies Deliver Tele-
phone Service?, 227 TELEPHONY, Nov. 28, 1994, at 54, 61.
15. Arnst, supra note 5, at 97.
16. Mark Robichaux and Leslie Cauley, Time Warner to Offer Telephone Service to
Businesses in New York City Market, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1994, at A3 (Midwest ed.).
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"Northeast Networks, a subsidiary of C-Tec Corporation, has ex-
pressed interest in providing residential telephony to customers in
Greenburgh, White Plains, and northern New York suburbs."' 7 For a
preview of what will come in the United States, the British experience
provides a likely model. 8 There, cable telephony is as routine as the
entry of cable TV companies into local markets. 19
Prospective entrants to local exchange and related markets thus
comprise a diverse set of firms, including IXCs, competitive access
providers (CAPs), and perhaps most notably, cable companies. The
prospect of such change in the local service market raises potentially
thorny regulatory issues. This article identifies several of these issues
and discusses their implications for telecommunications law, regula-
tion, and public policy. Eventually, policy makers must answer critical
questions: How should telecommunications regulation be changed to
prepare for entry into the local exchange? How should regulation
change as economically viable entry occurs in this market?
B. Issues Raised by Entry into Local Exchange Markets
Several issues are at the forefront of the ability of firms to enter
the market for local service provisioning. First, if the incumbent LECs
17. Davis, supra note 14, at 61.
18. In the United Kingdom, three regulatory agencies, the Office of Telecommunica-
tions (OfTel), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the Independent Televi-
sion Commission (ITC), unanimously decided to encourage competition and to discourage
excess regulation. See Investigation, supra note 13, at 3-4 (testimony of Michael Gilliam,
witness for SBC Media Ventures, Inc). Cable companies are encouraged to use any scope
economies that existed between their cable and telephone product lines, resulting in an
efficient cost structure for joint provision of cable TV and telephony. Id. SBC's cable
subsidiary in the United Kingdom, SBC CableComms, offered local service to its first sub-
scriber in August, 1992, eight months after it initiated the addition of telephony services to
its cable services. Id. In less than two years, more than 60,000 customers transferred their
telephone service to SBC CableComms. Id. About one of every four homes passed by the
cable network instead subscribed to SBC Cablecomms for their telephony needs, a pene-
tration rate of approximately 25%. Id. Less than 1% of such customers have returned to
British Telecom. Id.
19. Regulatory agencies in the United Kingdom favor entrants to foster cable entry
into telephony. British Telecomm is constrained to charging a uniform price across the
country and may not reduce prices in an individual location to deter entry or match com-
petitors' prices. In addition, cable telephony providers receive a subsidy in their intercon-
nection charge to British Telecomm's network. British Telecomm is subject to a ten-year
moratorium on entry into the video market. Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak,
Competition and Regulatory Policies for Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1203, 1231-32 (1995) (report prepared for the Director of Investigation and Research
of the Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy, filed Jan. 16, 1995, with the Canadian Ra-
dio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, Public Notice CRTC 1994-130 relat-
ing to Order-in-Council P.C. 1994-1689). However, most economists would consider these
policies to be potentially inefficient and would question whether true competition could be
sustained after such concessions were lifted.
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are afforded pricing flexibility in parity with entrants as entry occurs,
then any success of prospective entrants to the local exchange will
have determined whether LECs are sustainable natural monopolies, a
question that has bedeviled economists and regulatory agencies for
many years. Clearly, the LECs are not natural monopolies in the pro-
vision of local service if prospective new entrants such as cable compa-
nies succeed. Entry, in the face of legitimate competitive pricing
responses, indicates that local telephone service can efficiently be pro-
vided by more than one firm.
Second, the entry into local exchange markets by firms other than
LECs forces regulators and economists to question the extent of entry
barriers (in the mainstream economic sense) to the local service mar-
ket. It has long been contended that the answer to this question is
obvious: numerous and absolute barriers exist. However, several pro-
spective entrants to the local exchange market plan to commence or
complete their entry in 1995. This strongly suggests that what was
once considered the last bastion of monopoly in telecommunications
is, in fact, a workably contestable market, i.e., one in which the current
providers of service neither enjoy the protection of entry barriers nor
possess market power.
In sum, this article discusses: (1) the assumption that LECs are
natural monopolies; (2) the contention that many strong entry barriers
into LEC local exchange markets exist; and (3) the implications of
these issues for reforming telecommunications law, regulation, and
public policy.
II
Seminal Developments Affecting Local Exchange
Competition
Recent breakthrough events encouraging more local exchange
competition range from telephone company initiated restructuring
plans to co-carrier agreements and joint testing agreements between a
LEC and its competitors. Regulators and industry participants will
monitor these arrangements, which will influence greatly the transi-
tion to local exchange competition. The following section summarizes
the most important aspects of several of these landmark agreements.
1995]
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A. NYNEX Local Loop Unbundling
In 1985, the first competitive access network was introduced in
New York City,2" thus launching what is now familiar competition for
both access and local exchange services. Since then, the New York
Public Service Commission (NYPSC) has granted certificates to eight-
een companies to operate as local telephone companies in the
NYNEX territory.21 The NYPSC required NYNEX to unbundle its
local loops (links) from local switching (port). This enabled compet-
ing providers to offer their own switching services in conjunction with
resold NYNEX loops, or their own loop service in conjunction with
resold NYNEX switching services.22 The NYPSC believed that as
long as the LEC's link and port rate remained "bundled," competition
for links could not exist.23 The appropriate demarcation point for in-
terconnecting with the port is at the main distributing frame (a wiring
arrangement in a LEC central office which connects telephone lines
coming in from the outside world with the internal lines of the central
office), since outside plant facilities terminate and access to the switch
originates there.
NYNEX reached agreements with several competitors in New
York on interim arrangements for mutual compensation and local
number portability. The NYPSC permits competition for all intrastate
telecommunications services, and certifies competitive local exchange
providers as "LECs" with rights comparable to those of NYNEX.24
B. The Rochester Plan
Rochester Telephone Corporation filed a restructuring plan (the
Open Market Plan) with the NYPSC on February 3, 1993. After sub-
20. See In re NYNEX Telephone Cos. Petition for Waiver, 10 F.C.C.R. 7445, 1 14
(1993) (Transition Plan to Preserve Universal Service in a Competitive Environment) (rul-
ing by Commissioners Barrett, Ness, and Chong) [hereinafter Transition Plan].
21. Id.
22. In re Telecommunications Interconnection Arrangements, Open Network Archi-
tecture, and Comparably Efficient Interconnection, 128 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 97
(1991) (opinion of the NYPSC requiring the LEC to unbundle Centrex and Private Branch
Exchange access services into "port" and "link" components and to file interconnection
arrangements to allow competitive provision of these links; and requiring New York Tele-
phone Co. to file comparable tariffs for all classes of service, including residence and busi-
ness). See also Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Regarding Comparably Efficient
Interconnection Arrangements for Residential and Business Links, No. 91-C-1174, Order
Directing the Filing of Tariffs (issued May 25, 1994) (requiring LECs to file tariffs permit-
ting resale of the "link" component from unbundled local loop services).
23. Opinion No. 91-24, supra note 22. The NYPSC defined link as a pair of wires, or a
virtual circuit path, to the LEC switch. The port provides dial tone to the Public Switched
Network and possesses a unique network address (e.g., a telephone number). Id.
24. Transition Plan, supra note 20, 91 39.
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stantial modification, the NYPSC approved the plan on November 10,
1994,25 and implemented the plan on January 1, 1995. Rochester is
now structured into separate wholesale and retail entities. In return
for opening its local exchange to competition, the NYPSC granted
Rochester an end to profit limits and freedom to compete. Under the
restructuring plan, basic network services are offered on an unbun-
dled, discounted wholesale basis through a new, fully regulated sub-
sidiary under the Rochester name. Network services include the local
loop, switching, and transport functions needed by reseller carriers to
provide local telephone service. The Rochester subsidiary will con-
tinue to provide local exchange service as a retailer while serving as
the default carrier for customers not choosing another provider. This
wholesale subsidiary expects to provide local service to most end user
customers until alternate providers become more fully established.
Ultimately, the subsidiary expects to provide few services directly to
end users.
Frontier Communications of Rochester (Frontier), the new retail
subsidiary, offers local and intraLATA services in competition with
other local service providers. The NYPSC regulates Frontier as a non-
dominant carrier. Competing local service providers, including Fron-
tier, may purchase local loops, switching, or transport services from
either Rochester or alternative providers, or they may provide these
basic network services over their own network facilities. Thus, local
service providers may supply end user customers in a number of ways:
by purchasing all network elements from Rochester; by purchasing lo-
cal loops from Rochester and deploying their own switching and
transport networks; or by deploying their own local loop facilities and
buying Rochester's switching and transport services. 6
C. The Ameritech "Customers First" Plan
Ameritech filed a "Customers First" initiative with the FCC and
the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) in early 1993. Ameritech
offered to open markets to competition and to provide full network
interconnection capabilities in return for the ability to operate as a full
service provider, including relief from interLATA restrictions. On
April 7, 1995, the ICC declared the terms and conditions under which
25. Re Petition of Rochester Telephone Corp. for Approval of Proposed Restructuring
Plan, 160 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 554 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1994), No. 93-C-0103, Opinion
No. 94-25 (Nov. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Opinion No. 94-25].
26. In re Rochester Tel. Corp. Petition for Waivers to Implement its Open Market
Plan, 10 F.C.C.R. 6776, 3 (Mar. 7, 1995).
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Ameritech was to implement its Customers First proposal.27 The
terms and conditions set forth in the order include: (1) rejection of
Ameritech's proposed linkage of the plan to interLATA relief and im-
plementation without regard to when such relief may be granted by
the U.S. District Court;28 (2) adoption of full unbundling of Amer-
itech's networks and interconnection at all logical connection points,
including the interface between feeder and distribution plant, and re-
jection of requests that competitors be allowed to specify the network
design for unbundled components;2 9 (3) adoption of a pricing rule re-
quiring that the sum of the unbundled portions of the loop, port, and
monthly connection charges cannot exceed the total price of the bun-
dled line providing the same services and functions; 30 (4) adoption of
reciprocal compensation rates based upon the actual long run incre-
mental service costs which Illinois Bell would incur in providing termi-
nation services, including a reasonable level of contribution to
overhead costs; 31 (5) as an interim measure, resale of residential loops
and ports by certificated carriers to residential customers only pending
the outcome of a proceeding exploring the full range of issues associ-
ated with resale to business customers in a competitive local exchange
environment; 32 and (6) Modification of the proposed Ameritech End
Office Integration Service tariff to serve as a basis for a Uniform In-
terconnection Tariff and order to begin integrating existing intercon-
nection arrangements into this uniform tariff.33
In addition, the ICC resolved a number of interrelated issues
through interim orders in two related rulemakings. First, the ICC
adopted intraLATA presubscription using the "2-PIC" method,
whereby customers can pre-subscribe to different carriers for in-
terLATA and intraLATA traffic.34 Second, the ICC adopted rules on
line-side interconnection and reciprocal interconnection.35 These
rules contain a provision for unbundling the local loop into "loop
27. In re Illinois Bell Telephone Co. Proposed Introduction of a Trial of Ameritech's
Customer First Plan in Illinois, No. 94-0096, 94-0117, 94-0146, 94-0301, 1995 Ill. PUC
LEXIS 230 (Apr. 7, 1995).
28. Id. at *40-78.
29. Id. at *78-101.
30. Id. at *102-28.
31. Id. at *173-217.
32. Id. at *131-41.
33. Id. at *153-73.
34. In re Illinois Commerce Commission On Its Own Motion: Adoption of Rules Re-
lating to Intra-Market Service Area Presubscription and Changes in Dialing Arrangements
Related to the Implementation of Such Presubscription, No. 94-0048, 1995 I11. PUC LEXIS
228, at *21-36 (Apr. 7, 1995).
35. In re Illinois Commerce Commission On Its Own Motion: Adoption of Rules on
Line-Side Interconnection and Reciprocal Interconnection, No. 94-0049, 1995 Ill. PUC
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subelements" and require the interconnector and LEC to agree on the
technical characteristics of loop subelements. These rules exclude
smaller incumbent LECs during a three-year transition period. This is
to ensure that the interconnection requirements work, that the
presubscription process goes smoothly, and that there is discussion ad-
dressing rural concerns. With these orders, the ICC established the
conditions it considers necessary to foster local exchange competition.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) also recognized the signifi-
cance of Ameritech's plan. On April 13, 1995, the DOJ filed a motion
with the Decree Court to allow Ameritech to offer interLATA long
distance on a trial basis.36 The DOJ specified Ameritech could enter
the long distance market only after it met certain preconditions and
safeguards. These include unbundling loops and ports; local parity;
resale of local services; interconnection, number portability, and non-
discriminatory number assignment; establishment of a separate long
distance subsidiary; and the development of actual competition and
opportunities for substantial local exchange competition.37
The first company authorized by the ICC to offer competitive lo-
cal service in Chicago was MFS Communications Company (MFS). In
addition, AT&T recently filed a request to re-enter the local tele-
phone business in Chicago and Grand Rapids, Michigan. The com-
pany hoped to obtain the necessary approvals and provide service by
late 1995.38
LEXIS 499 (Aug. 7, 1995) (adopting rules to govern line-side interconnection but not rul-
ing on reciprocal interconnection issues).
Line-side interconnection describes the ability of a competitor or customer to inter-
connect its facilities with the portion of the LEC network that extends from the central
office to the customer's premises. Id. at *9, 17-18.
36. Motion of the United States for a Modification of the Decree to Permit a Trial,
Supervised by the Department of Justice and the Court, in Which Ameritech Could Pro-
vide Interexchange Service for a Limited Geographic Area, withi Appropriate Safeguards,
When Actual Competition and Substantial Opportunities for Additional Competition in
Local Exchange Service Develop, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982)
(No. 82-0192), affd 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); See also Mark Landler, Plan for a Bell's Long-
Distance Service, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1995, at C4.
37. See supra note 36.
38. John J. Keller, AT&T Requests Local Services in Two States, WALL ST. J., May 4,
1995, at A3. See also Application of AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc., for Certifica-
tion to Provide Facilities Based and Resold Exchange Telecommunications Service in
Those Portions of MSA-1 Served by Illinois Bell Telephone Co. dlb/a Ameritech Illinois
and Central Telephone Co., No. 95-0197 (May 2, 1995). At the same time, AT&T also filed
with regulators in Michigan to offer local telephone services there. See Application of
AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc. for a License to Provide Local Exchange Serv-
ices in the Grand Rapids LATA Exchanges Currently Served by Ameritech Michigan and
GTE, No. U-10845 (May 3, 1995).
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AT&T intends to resell the incumbent LEC's local exchange
services to residential and business customers. As its facilities are
deployed, AT&T will provide exchange services on a facilities basis.
Ameritech's interconnection and unbundled local exchange service
component tariffs became effective on May 27, 1995. However,
Ameritech's local exchange competitors, including AT&T, MCI, MFS,
and Teleport, have each filed a complaint with the ICC, objecting to
various provisions of the tariff.
D. Co-Carrier Agreements
Co-carrier status in the telecommunications industry indicates
that a telephone company's status equals that of existing LECs, in-
cluding regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) and independent
LECs. Key elements of co-carrier status include:
1. Network interconnection, allowing unimpeded transmission of a
call from one carrier's network to another's;
2. Assignment of telephone numbers that competitive companies
can issue directly to customers;
3. Reciprocal compensation, whereby each carrier compensates the
other for completion of calls on its network; and
4. Number portability, allowing customers to choose another local
carrier without changing their telephone numbers.39
LECs consider co-carrier status an important characterization for
effective local exchange competition because it affords rivals the fi-
nancial and operational arrangements typically found among in-
dependent local exchange companies. The price of interconnection,
for example, can materially affect whether or not a rival can be com-
petitive, and voluntary co-carrier arrangements represent mutually
agreeable solutions to this pricing problem.
The first co-carrier agreement between competitors was reached
on January 24, 1995 between MFS and NYNEX in New York. This
arrangement established reciprocal compensation, sharply cutting the
cost of interconnection for MFS. In addition, NYNEX and MFS
agreed on an interim solution for number portability, whereby
NYNEX will simply forward calls to MFS's customers for a nominal
monthly charge. This agreement was hailed as a near-term solution to
many co-carrier issues and a milestone toward the development of lo-
cal telephone competition.
NYNEX reportedly was also negotiating with at least five other
rivals, including cable television operators Time Warner and Cablevi-
39. MFS Communications Company Completes Landmark Co-Carrier Agreement With
NYNEX, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRnews file
(MFS Public Relations announcement).
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sion Systems Corporation (Cablevision), which planned to offer local
phone services to NYNEX's residential customers over their cable
lines.40 An agreement was reportedly reached with Cablevision on
February 16, 1995.41 According to MFS, many elements of co-carrier
status have also now been achieved in Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, and Michigan. Co-carrier proceedings are pending in Ohio, Or-
egon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Connecticut, New Jersey, California, and
other jurisdictions.42
E. The Maryland Joint Test on Loop Unbundling
An additional step toward local exchange competition is the co-
operative test on loop unbundling recently announced by Bell Atlan-
tic and MFS Intelenet, an MFS Communications Corporation
subsidiary, in Maryland.43 The test's aim is to identify and develop the
administrative, operational, and technical procedures associated with
provisioning voice-grade, analog, unbundled loops. The test will be
conducted in one central office in Baltimore and may be expanded to
include additional test sites. By conducting the test, Bell Atlantic and
MFS Intelenet expect to gain a more clear and comprehensive under-
standing of the process, functions, and associated costs involved in
loop unbundling.
III
Are Key Assumptions Behind the MFJ Still Valid?
One economic argument favoring regulation surfaces when an in-
dustry is characterized by technical "natural monopoly" cost condi-
tions. The argument asserts that when faced with the cost structure of
a natural monopolist, market forces alone cannot be relied upon to
ensure the efficient allocation of resources. Instead, the natural mo-
nopoly must be either publicly regulated or nationalized." Histori-
cally, Great Britain and other European countries have followed a
40. Gautam Naik, Nynex Local-Phone Pact Aids Tiny Rival, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
1995, at B8 (Midwest ed.).
41. Nynex Reaches Local Service Pact With Cable Company, REUTER Bus. REP., Feb.
16, 1995.
42. MFS Reaches First Co-Carrier Agreement with NYNEX in Massachusetts, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Apr. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRnews file (MFS Public Rela-
tions announcement).
43. Letter from Randal Mitch, Vice President and General Counsel, Bell Atlantic-
Maryland, Inc., to Daniel P. Gahagan, Executive Secretary, Maryland Public Service Com-
mission (Mar. 2, 1995) (regarding Case No. 8584, Phase II before the Maryland Public
Service Commission).
44. See MICHAEL WATERSON, REGULATION OF THE FIRM AND NATURAL MONOPOLY
(1988).
1995]
nationalization strategy, while the United States has regulated natural
monopolies (or industries thought to be natural monopolies) by means
of public utility regulation.
In simple terms, an industry is a natural monopoly if, at the so-
cially optimal level of output, industry cost is minimized by having
only one firm produce. 45 From a more technical perspective, an in-
dustry is a natural monopoly if one firm has a subadditive cost func-
tion, meaning that it can produce the optimal industry level of output
less expensively than any collection of two or more firms, whose indi-
vidual levels of output sum to the total industry level of output.46
Prior to the divestiture of AT&T, it was generally agreed that
both interexchange and local exchange markets had natural monopoly
characteristics, although even then, the question was far from set-
tled.47 More importantly, one of the primary underpinnings of the an-
titrust settlement known as the AT&T Consent Decree, 48  or
Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), is the court's assumption that
RBOCs are natural monopolies in the provision of local service. This
premise was explicitly behind the initial imposition of the MFJ's line-
of-business restrictions, and today is responsible for the perpetuation
of those restrictions that remain in force. Yet, the emergence of en-
45. W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 309 (1992).
46. See Ronald R. Braeutigam, Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies, in 2 HAND-
BOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1289, 1294-95 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989). See also John C. Panzar, Technological Determinants of Firm and Indus-
try Structure, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 4, 23-24 (Richard Schmalen-
see & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). William J. Baumol is responsible for formulating the
modern concept of natural monopoly. See William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for
Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 809 (1977). See gener-
ally KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY (1991); SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REG-
ULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1988); MICHAEL WATERSON, REGULATION OF THE
FIRM AND NATURAL MONOPOLY (1988); GAVIN C. REID, THEORIES OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION (1987).
47. See generally WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 181-
213 (1982) ("Certainly under the broadest definition... [the telecommunications] industry
is not a natural monopoly.").
48. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 178-79 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The MFJ prohibited the RBOCs from
manufacturing equipment, providing interexchange services, providing information serv-
ices, or entering any non-telecommunications line of business. Id. at 143. The prohibitions
on information services and non-telecommunications enterprises have been removed,
while the manufacturing and interexchange restrictions remain. Further, the RBOCs have
been allowed to provide interLATA long distance through their cellular subsidiaries, sub-
ject to several conditions. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995)
("Generic Wireless Opinion"). See also Leslie Cauley, Seven Baby Bells Win Right to Pro-
vide Long-Distance to Cellular Customers, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1995, at B4 (Midwest ed.).
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trants into the local service market calls this underpinning of the MFJ
into question. 9
In the economics literature, several authors conclude that regula-
tion or nationalization of natural monopoly is not the only means of
efficient resource allocation."0 Additionally, market entry conditions
and technical cost characteristics of the natural monopolist also influ-
ence which sound economic policies can be prescribed. 51 If LECs are
afforded substantial pricing flexibility and entry requires one to incur
significant sunk costs, then observed entry and the subsequent finan-
cial success of entrants provides strong proof that an LEC's local ser-
vice franchise is not a natural monopoly.
Economic theory dictates that regulation, consisting of price con-
trols combined with entry restrictions, may be required if an industry
is to be served most efficiently by a natural monopoly.52 The econom-
ics literature concludes that if a firm is a natural monopoly, it has the
ability to price monopolistically, and regulation on its high-end prices
is one way to curtail this problem.5 3 Restrictions on entry into the
industry in question may also be prescribed by economists. Since, by
definition, a natural monopoly is the most efficient way of supplying
the entire industry demand, entry by other suppliers cannot result in
greater efficiency in production. 4
Although several papers in the economics literature have ex-
amined whether the pre-divestiture AT&T was a natural monopoly
(with mixed results), relatively little research has been conducted on
whether LECs are (or were, in the pre-divestiture period) natural mo-
nopolies in the local exchange. 5 Recent econometric research by
49. This has been argued in MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS LAW (1992). Cf PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE GEODESIC NETWORK II: 1993
REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1992). "It is not enough to note
that there exist technological alternatives to the services offered by established [LECs]. In
order to be viable, alternatives must be available at costs which are comparable to the costs
of established [LEC] providers." Bruce C. Greenwald & William W. Sharkey, The Eco-
nomics of Deregulation of Local Exchange Telecommunications, 1 J. REG. ECON. 319, 330-
31 (1989).
50. Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 9 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968); ISREAL
KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL.,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982) [hereinafter
BAUMOL ET AL.].
51. See KIRZNER, supra note 50; BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 50; DEMSETZ, supra note
50.
52. WATERSON, supra note 44, at 36.
53. Id. at 14.
54. KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATU-
RAL MONOPOLY 1 (1991).
"55. This research has been surveyed in Ferenc Kiss & Bernard J. Lefebvre,
Econometric Models of Telecommunications Firms: A Survey, 38 REVUE ECONOMIQUE
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Shin and Ying concludes that the pre-divestiture LECs were not natu-
ral monopolies.56 Subsequent econometric research conducted by
Ying concludes that in the post-divestiture period, the LECs do not
exhibit natural monopoly cost characteristics. 57
A. What Can Entry Reasonably Indicate About the "Natural Monopoly"
Assumption?
Using applied regulatory economics, it is possible to analyze in-
stances of entry, and the conditions surrounding that entry, in deter-
mining whether the incumbent firm is a natural monopoly. It is
important to recognize this because the mere observance of entry or
planned entry, in and of itself, does not automatically yield a correct
inference that a sole incumbent supplier is not a natural monopoly.
The regulatory economics concept of sustainability enables the analyst
to infer when entry is likely to indicate that a natural monopoly is not
present. This discussion develops an exposition of the sustainability
concept and how it can be used to determine whether an incumbent
firm is likely a natural monopolist.
In simple terms, a natural monopoly is sustainable if it can pre-
vent entry by uninnovative entrants." If a natural monopolist is sus-
tainable, then in a market without restrictions or barriers to entry,
there can be no entry by a rival. A firm still may enter if it possesses a
superior technology to the natural monopolist, or if the monopolist
chooses, either by mistake or by regulatory influence, a price that is
not sustainable.59 There are two types of sustainability: price and
quantity. The latter of these two concepts is more relevant to this
analysis. Assume that when faced with entry, an incumbent firm
307 (1987); Richard T. Shin & John S. Ying, Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone, 23
RAND J. ECON. 171, 171-73 (1992). See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 428 n.24 (1992).
56. Shin & Ying, supra note 55, at 181 (concluding that LECs do not have a subaddi-
tive cost function, and hence are not natural monopolies). See Maria E. Maher, Access
Costs and Entry in the Local Telecommunications Network: A Case for De-Averaged
Rates (1993) (unpublished manuscript, University of Cambridge, Department of Applied
Economics (Working Paper No. 9315)) (on file with the author).
57. See Motion of Bell Atlantic Corporation, BellSouth Corporation, Nynex Corpora-
tion, and Southwestern Bell Corporation to Vacate the Decree, Appendix Volume II, Affi-
davit of John S. Ying, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995)
(No. 82-0192) [hereinafter Ying Affidavit].
58. William A. Brock & Josd A. Scheinkman, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Nat-
ural Monopoly: Bertrand Revisited by Cournot, in BREAKING Up BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 231 (David S. Evans ed., 1983). In other words,
a natural monopoly is sustainable at a given set of prices and quantities if any entrant
contemplating production and entry anticipates negative profits at the given price. Id. See
also BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 50, at 192-93.
59. SHARKEY, supra note 47, at 87.
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keeps its quantity of output fixed, and adjusts its prices to absorb the
expected excess output of the entrant and its effect on market prices.
The entrants conjecture that the incumbent will take such action. If
these prices (after they are adjusted post-entry) are always too low to
allow the entrant to earn positive profits, then the incumbent firm is a
quantity sustainable natural monopoly. Industry supply is most effi-
ciently produced when the incumbent monopolist supplies the entire
level of output needed to meet industry demand.
The concept of price sustainability is not as useful to this discus-
sion, for it assumes that the incumbent will leave prices fixed and ad-
just output in response to entry. Although LECs often have little or
no pricing flexibility, given the common carrier responsibility of
LECs, this scenario is not realistic.6" Further, it will soon become
clear that public policy should not create conditions in which an in-
cumbent LEC cannot adjust its prices in response to entry.6 Prohibit-
ing LEC price adjustments would prevent regulators from making
inferences about the nature of the market by observing entry.
Entry into a public utility market, such as local exchange tele-
phone service, could occur for several reasons. For example, entry
may be spawned by inefficient prices coupled with a lack of pricing
flexibility for incumbent LECs, allowing a narrowly focused provider
to enter the market.62 Such entry may or may not be efficient. Sec-
ond, new technology can erode the economies of scale and scope pos-
sessed by the LEC, making entry financially feasible.63 Third, a new
entrant may provide services that meet a currently unfilled market
need.' Fourth, a regulatory agency may seek to foster "competition"
(defined simply as the addition of other suppliers in the market),
whether efficient or not, and pursue policies that cause entry.65
Again, such entry may be inefficient.
Given some of the possible reasons behind entry, what can the
concept of quantity sustainability tell the regulator about a market?
The answer depends on the nature of entry conditions. Assume that a
significant portion of the incumbent's and entrant's costs are sunk. In
60. In other words, the LECs do not have much freedom to adjust their output levels
to compete with entrants if their prices must remain fixed.
61. This was first analyzed in John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the
Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1977); see Beth Hayes & Daniel
Siegel, Rate of Return Regulation with Price Flexibility, 59 J. Bus. 537 (1986).
62. Curtis A. Cramer, Local Competition for Telephone Services, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG.
273 (1994).
63. Id. at 273.
64. Id. at 274.
65. Id.
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this case, it is in the incumbent's interest to maintain output levels
after entry has occurred, and in the entrant's self-interest to enter only
if it expects to earn profits at post-entry prices. Also, one should as-
sume that the market is one in which prices adjust quickly to absorb
the additional output from the entrant. This in turn requires the as-
sumption that the incumbent has significant pricing flexibility to meet
competition from entrants. If these assumptions hold true in a mar-
ket, then the concept of quantity sustainability is useful-it enables
one to tell if the incumbent firm is a natural monopoly (in the services
it currently offers) simply by observing entry.
If an incumbent firm is not quantity sustainable, then it is not a
natural monopoly.66 This seemingly innocuous statement is far more
useful than it appears at first glance. It means that if the incumbent
firm has significant sunk costs and pricing flexibility, one may easily
see if it is not quantity sustainable. If entry occurs successfully, the
incumbent firm is not quantity sustainable. If it is not quantity sus-
tainable, it cannot be a natural monopoly. Thus, observing entry
(under the above conditions) tells a regulatory agency that the incum-
bent firm is not a natural monopoly.67
Two rules of thumb can be constructed from applied regulatory
economics. If the following conditions are observed, then one can
reasonably conclude that the incumbent firm is not a natural monop-
oly in relevant markets:
1. Entry occurs, and it is known that the incumbent firm has pricing
flexibility and significant levels of sunk costs. In this case, it can
be reasonably concluded that the incumbent firm is not quantity
sustainable, and hence not a natural monopoly.
2. Entry occurs in a market in which the multiproduct incumbent
firm must be subsidized to at least cover its total incremental
costs in that market and offer reasonable prices to consumers(such as residential basic local exchange service), and the entrant
does not require subsidies to service the market profitably. In
this case, the incumbent is not a natural monopoly.68
Of course, it is possible to observe entry that ultimately cannot
withstand the legitimate pricing responses of the incumbent firm. Fur-
ther, if entry is observed, and the incumbent firm has significant levels
66. This conclusion relies on Brock & Scheinkman, supra note 58, at 237-46. Techni-
cally, if a firm is not quantity sustainable, then successful entry implies that the incumbent
firm is not a natural monopoly at some other quantity. In addition, price discrimination
may be necessary for both incumbent and entrant to break even at the new post-entry
quantity. Id. at 239. However, price discrimination is not economically objectionable if it
improves consumer welfare.
67. Id. at 250.
68. This assumes that if interconnection is required for other firms to enter the mar-
ket, the terms of interconnection are at least at socially optimal rates. See infra note 99.
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of sunk costs but does not have pricing flexibility, at least two conclu-
sions are possible: (1) the incumbent is a natural monopoly, but it is
not price sustainable (it cannot leave prices fixed, and successfully ad-
just the quantities it sells to stave off inefficient entrants); or (2) the
incumbent firm is a non-natural monopoly that was sustainable only
due to entry barriers, but is no longer so. The lack of pricing flexibil-
ity makes it difficult to distinguish between these two possible
conclusions.
B. The Natural Monopoly Assumption and Telecommunications
Entry can tell regulators a great deal about a market that con-
forms to certain entry conditions. If the prospective entrants observed
today enjoy long-term success in their proposed ventures, all of the
analysis and speculation about the LECs as natural monopolists will
largely be rendered moot, and the very question of LECs as natural
monopolies settled in pragmatic terms. The success of such entrants
will indicate that LECs are not natural monopolies in providing local
service in those markets where entry occurs.69 If a LEC is truly a
natural monopoly, then no other firm or combination of firms can
supply local service profitably at a lower cost than the LEC. Given
the conditions discussed above, the successful emergence of non-LEC
alternatives in the local service market will disprove any presumptions
that LECs are natural monopolies. 7° This result would dovetail with
Ying's conclusion that "[r]elative to the pre-divestiture period, LECs
are much less likely today to be natural monopolies."71
69. It is not yet possible to infer from planned or observed entry that the RBOCs are
not natural monopolists in at least some portions of the local exchange market. If entry
were observed in the high-cost rural residential markets, one may argue that the entire
local exchange market is now unsustainable. However, entry indicates that one must ques-
tion the assumption that RBOCs are natural monopolies in the most important markets-
the metro areas. It is unnecessary for the entire local exchange market to be unsustainable
to warrant regulatory reform.
70. For this statement to be generally true, LECs must have pricing flexibility in parity
with the entrants. Otherwise, an LEC could be a natural monopolist that cannot prevent
entry by inefficient firms, due only to its lack of downward pricing flexibility. In other
words, the LECs could be so-called unsustainable natural monopolists. In this case, ob-
served entry does not mean the LECs are not natural monopolists; it means only that entry
is successful because an LEC does not possess the pricing flexibility it needs to prevent
entry by inefficient firms.
71. Ying Affidavit, supra note 57, at 10. But see Sanford V. Berg & John Tschirhart, A
Market Test for Natural Monopoly in Local Exchange, 8 J. REG. ECON. 103 (1995) (con-
cluding that LECs are either non-sustainable natural monopolies or non-natural monopo-
lies in the services they currently provide; but that to formulate meaningful policies, one
must examine whether LECs or other firms are natural monopolies over the superset of
services offered by LECs and their competitors).
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This conclusion has some powerful implications regarding signifi-
cant entry barriers to the local service market.72 It has equally power-
ful implications for current telecommunications policies, such as the
way in which LECs facing such entry should be regulated. For exam-
ple, at the time of divestiture, courts presumed that local service by
itself was a natural monopoly.7 3 The underlying premise of the anti-
trust case against AT&T and the resulting Consent Decree "was that
AT&T had used its natural monopoly over local-exchange services to
impede competition in related markets."74 In 1987, the court took the
position that "[o]nly when a practical and economically-sound method
is found for large-scale bypass or for connecting local consumers by a
different method.., can the Regional Companies' local monopoly be
regarded as eroded. '75 Entry into RBOC local service territories will
offer some compelling proof that their local exchanges are presently
not a natural monopoly, and that a reassessment of the consent decree
may be warranted on this ground alone.76
In addition, basic local exchange service is the most stringently
regulated telecommunications service. In areas where entry occurs,
however, regulation of the upper limits on local service pricing could
quickly become ineffective. This is true because competition between
an LEC and an efficient entrant (such as a cable company offering
both cable TV and telephony) will probably be. enough to police any
significant market power that an LEC otherwise may have in the local
exchange, absent regulation.
Successful entry into RBOC local service markets will call into
question the logic behind recently proposed laws such as the Brooks-
Dingell Bill on MFJ reform in telecommunications, passed by the
House of Representatives during the first session of 1993.77 Under
the proposed bill, before an RBOC could offer expanded services, the
Attorney General and the FCC must publish an application for au-
thorization in the Federal Register within ten days of receipt of the
72. See discussion infra Part IV.
73. See, e.g., MCI Comms. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) ("Given present technology, local telephone service is gener-
ally regarded as a natural monopoly and is regulated as such.").
74. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 1387, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
75. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. at 525, 545. (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd.
874 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and modified, 900 F.2d 283 (1990).
76. This has also been argued in Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications,
12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995).
77. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill sponsored by Reps. Brooks and
Dingell was the so-called Antitrust Reform Act of 1993. See Jeffrey Walker, Missed Con-
nections: One Failed Attempt to Ease Restrictions on Bell Operating Companies, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 439 (1994).
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application. The Bill requires the Attorney General to approve appli-
cations only upon finding "that there is no substantial possibility that
such company or its affiliates could use monopoly power to impede
competition in the market such company seeks to enter."78 A similar
standard was written into the Senate version of the proposed Telecom-
munications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995 (the "Pressler"
Bill), which passed on June 15, 1995.79 Upon enactment, section 221
of the Bill would allow RBOCs to provide out-of-service-region in-
terLATA services, but within-region interLATA services only when
the RBOC readies an interconnection agreement that meets a de-
tailed and extensive competitive checklist, and obtains FCC approval
of its application. The FCC may grant approval after it consults with
the Attorney General and finds the request consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.
C. The Decline of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine
The successful entry of various new carriers into local exchange
markets also calls into question the pervasive "leverage theory" (the
theory that a firm with market power in one market can "leverage"
that market power to obtain market power in other related markets).
If there is competition in the local exchange market, the leveraging
issue is moot. Observed entry into local exchange markets aside, lev-
erage theory has never attained realistic credibility in the formal eco-
nomics literature, and courts' adherence to the monopoly leveraging
doctrine in antitrust cases has been declining.
If other firms can enter local exchange markets, as several plan to
do in 1995, their entry begs two questions: (1) Why did the LECs'
alleged ability to engage in leverage not prevent entry in the first
place?, and (2) If entry into local exchange markets is possible, what is
the source of the "leverage" that RBOCs could use to extend market
power to other markets they might seek to enter?
Leverage theory is defined differently in the economics literature
and the courts. In economics, leverage theory is as defined above: a
firm can "leverage" market power in one market to obtain market
power in other, related markets. The monopoly leveraging doctrine as
used in the courts has a less stringent definition. It concerns the use of
economic power in one market to gain an "unfair" advantage, but not
necessarily market power, in another.
78. H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1993).
79. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (S. 652 passed on a vote of 81-18).
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The economics literature does not provide strong support for lev-
erage theory; at best, the literature supports its validity only under
highly theoretical, but unrealistic circumstances, making leverage an
implausible scenario in actual industrial or service markets.80 For
many years, the reasoning behind leveraging was dismissed by most
economists, who generally consider the extension of monopoly a very
poor rationale for engaging in tied sales or similar practices. Over the
past several years, and with increasing sophistication and rigor, lever-
age theory has been questioned seriously by several authors in the
legal literature81 as well as in the more formal economics literature.82
The few economic models in which leveraging incentives are shown to
exist require theoretical conditions that are very difficult to find in
real industrial markets.8 3
The courts, on the other hand, have rejected the monopoly lever-
aging doctrine in antitrust court decisions rendered since 1991, making
it difficult for plaintiffs in section 2 Sherman Act cases to succeed to-
day without showing that a defendant's conduct creates a dangerous
threat of monopolization. 84 The courts today are concerned with eco-
nomic efficiency and competition, not competitors. Even the Berkey
Photo court,85 which confirmed that the use of monopoly power in
one market to gain a competitive advantage in another market is a
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if there has not been
80. See Alexander C. Larson, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: A Comment, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 239 (1994), for a survey of the economics literature on leverage theory.
81. See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regula-
tion, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281 (1956); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTI-
TRUST LAW (1973); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
171-84 (1976); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 365-81 (1978); Charles J.
Smaistrla, Note, An Analysis of Tying Arrangements: Invalidating the Leveraging Hypothe-
sis, 61 TEX. L. REv. 893 (1983); and Keith K. Wollenberg, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In
Sales: Re-Examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REV. 737 (1987).
82. M. L. Burstein, The Economics of Tie-In Sales, 42 REV. ECON. & STAT. 68 (1960);
Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1978); Richard Schmalensee, Commodity Bundling by Single-Prod-
uct Monopolies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1982); ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN,
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 382-94 (1985).
83. Jos6 Carbajo et al., A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling, 38 J. IND.
ECON. 283, 284 (1990); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 837 (1990); and Daniel J. Seidmann, Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Rein-
terpretation of Leverage Theory, 58 ECONOMICA 491 (1991). The assumptions employed in
the modern game-theoretic models of leveraging are discussed in Larson, supra note 80, at
258.
84. See Joseph Kattan, The Decline of the Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine, 9 ANTI-
TRUST 41 (Fall 1994).
85. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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an attempt to monopolize the second market, recognized that denying
integrated firms the benefits of integration could dampen their incen-
tives to innovate.86
Prior to 1991, courts rendered few decisions based on the monop-
oly leveraging doctrine spawned by the Berkey Photo court.87 Some
courts, however, questioned the wisdom of the doctrine from the be-
ginning," and starting in 1991, several courts either rejected the mo-
nopoly leveraging doctrine, or reinterpreted monopoly leveraging
claims to require proof of a dangerous probability of monopolizing a
market.89
D. Summary
One must question the efficacy of continuing the restrictions of
the MFJ or of implementing asymmetric regulation of LECs in the
face of competitive entry. Observed entry into local exchange mar-
kets invalidates the natural monopoly assumption on which the MFJ is
based.
Further, in mainstream economics, the power to "leverage" mo-
nopoly power is considered an unrealistic ability even if a mul-
tiproduct firm is a natural monopolist in some of the markets in which
it operates. Neither the economic concept of leverage theory nor the
trends involving the monopoly leveraging doctrine as used in the
86. Id. at 275-76.
87. See Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle
E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826 (C.D. I11. 1990), affd sub nom. Illinois ex rel. Burris v.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1169
(1992); Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publishing Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,082, at
6,963-64 (D.N.D. 1989).
88. Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577, 586
n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting the "substantial academic criticism" of the doctrine, while
finding it unnecessary to adopt or reject it); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d
490, 493-95 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987) (determining that there was
no distinct monopoly leveraging theory under which a plaintiff could avoid the require-
ment of showing that the defendant threatened to monopolize a second market); Twin
Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the
Berkey court's treatment of monopoly leveraging was mere "dictum") (emphasis added).
89. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 206
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1993); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S.
Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993); Advanced Health-Care Serv. v. Giles Memorial Hosp., 846 F. Supp.
488, 497 (W.D. Va. 1994); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. E., 1992-3 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,412 (W.D. Mo. 1993); Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Independence Blue Cross, 1994-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,526 (E.D. Pa. 1994); and United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1994-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,598 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). But see Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Ab-
bott Labs., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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courts support the continuation of the MFJ or asymmetric regulation
of RBOCs as compared with their competitors.
Ignoring state public utility regulation for the moment, the fact
that we now observe entry into local exchange markets raises the
question whether there is significant market power to "leverage" in
the first place. Overall, entry into local exchange markets calls into
question two of the major assumptions behind the MFJ and the impo-
sition of asymmetric regulation of RBOCs vis-A-vis their competitors.
Further, the application of the monopoly leveraging doctrine in the
courts has been in steady decline since both the implementation of the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions on January 1, 1984 and the Justice
Department's first Triennial Review of the MFJ in 1987.90 Partial de-
regulation and regulatory reform thus could lead to substantial social
benefits even in industries retaining some natural monopoly
characteristics. 91
IV
Entry Barriers
The concept of entry barriers is often misunderstood in regula-
tory proceedings and antitrust courts. As a primary source of confu-
sion, the economics literature takes a seemingly schismatic view of
entry barriers. Similarly, on the rare occasion when the courts have
addressed entry barriers, they have failed to employ sound or even
uniform economic principles in their determinations of what consti-
tutes an entry barrier to real markets.
Entry barriers themselves are neither desirable nor harmful.
What really matters is whether a firm or group of firms working in
concert can maintain or exercise significant market power. Entry bar-
riers or other conditions may lead to such market power. The over-
arching concern of public policy is preventing firms from charging
prices in excess of competitive levels for significant periods of time.
Entry barriers allow firms to circumvent this policy goal.
In the economics literature, the concept of entry barriers has
evolved primarily from the ideas put forth by Bain,92 Stigler,93 and
90. HUBER, supra note 1.
91. Greenwald & Sharkey, supra note 49, at 337.
92. JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). A Bainian entry barrier
exists depending on the "extent to which, in the long run, established firms can elevate
their selling prices above the minimal average costs of production and distribution ...
without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry." JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 252 (2d ed. 1968). Examples of Bainian entry barriers include scale econo-
mies, the capital costs of entry, and absolute cost advantages of existing firms.
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von Weizsacker. 94 The modern view of entry barriers, which conforms
with the definition developed by von Weizsacker, is that an entry bar-
rier is a production cost borne by entrants, which is not (or was not)
borne by incumbent firms, and which results in social welfare losses,
i.e., less efficient outcomes. When practically applied, this definition
indicates that not every requirement of producing, distributing, or
marketing a product that imposes differential costs on entrants should
be considered an entry barrier in economic terms. 95 For example, a
firm that develops or owns a cost-reducing innovation not available to
entrants may appear to enjoy an entry barrier. Because cost reduc-
tions can benefit consumer welfare in the form of lower prices, how-
ever, engaging in cost-reducing innovation or efficient production
does not raise entry barriers in the von Weizsacker framework.96
In pragmatic terms, the von Weizsticker framework's entry-bar-
rier analysis for public policy can be conducted in the two-stage pro-
cess proposed by Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington.97 In the first stage,
a state public utility commission would analyze the assumption that
something is an entry barrier. It would seek to determine whether
existing firms can maintain prices above economic cost while entry is
deterred or forestalled, thereby decreasing total economic welfare. In
the second stage, the commission would consider whether it can im-
plement a policy to "remove" the barrier and improve social
welfare. 98
93. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (Univ. of Chicago Press
ed. 1983). A Stiglerian entry barrier exists if there is "a cost of producing (at some or every
rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not
borne by firms already in the industry." Id. at 67.
94. Carl Christian von Weizsacker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 BELL J.
ECON. 399, 400 (1980) ("A barrier to entry is a cost of producing which must be borne by a
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry and
which implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from the social point of view.").
Essentially, von Weizsmacker's analysis indicated that under some simple assumptions (e.g.,
linear demand, Cournot entry, scale economies in all firms' cost functions), the socially
optimal number of entrants can be smaller than the equilibrium number of entrants. The
fact that entrants beyond the socially optimal number may be precluded from entry does
not harm economic efficiency. Hence, entry barriers in the Bainian or Stiglerian frame-
work may not be welfare-decreasing and would not engender market power. See also, C.
C. VON WEIZSACKER, LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS:
BARRIERS TO ENTRY 13 (M. Beckman & H.P. Ktlnzi eds., 1980).
95. Robin C. Landis & Ronald S. Rolfe, Market Conduct Under Section 2: When Is It
Anticompetitive?, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. MC-
GOWAN, 131, 135 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985).
96. Id. at 143-44 n.1.
97. W. KiP VIScUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 163 (1992).
98. Id.
1995]
A. Do Local Exchange Market Entry Barriers Really Exist?
It has long been contended that entry barriers into certain tele-
phone markets, especially the basic local exchange markets, are nu-
merous and absolute. Local residence service is a "benefited" service
generally sold at prices less than cost to meet universal service goals.
The root of this contention is due in large part to sunk costs. The
amount of sunk cost required to set up a network is assumed to be
huge, and hence onerous. The planned entry into the local service
market by several firms, however, turns these arguments on their
head, for one can now persuasively argue that entry barriers into the
most lucrative portions of the local exchange are quite low (for exam-
ple, for a cable company offering both video and telephony over its
network) or may not exist.
The average incremental cost of providing telephony, for a cable
company with a fiber optic network passing nearly all of the homes in
a local exchange franchise, is probably far less than the corresponding
cost to an unintegrated (or dissimilarly integrated) firm seeking to
enter the market only as a provider of telephony. The implication is
that for a cable company (and perhaps many other consortia of firms)
there may be no entry barriers into the local exchange market. If en-
try barriers do exist, however, they most likely arise from two sources:
(1) the inability to obtain a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
(CCN), which acts as an absolute proscription on entry much like the
MFJ's line-of-business restrictions; and (2) a lack of socially optimal
interconnection terms for access to required services or network func-
tions of the LECs. If new entrants obtain CCNs and can earn at least
zero economic profits while paying socially optimal interconnection
rates,99 their entry into local exchange markets will prove that entry
barriers into such markets are very low or nonexistent.
99. Socially optimal interconnection rates are those rates which maximize the change
in economic welfare between the pre-entry period and the post-entry period. Thus, so-
cially optimal interconnection rates are designed to maximize the algebraic sum of incum-
bent firm profits, entrants' profits, and consumer surplus in the downstream retail market.
For a survey of methods used to arrive at interconnection rates, see Alexander C. Larson,
Pricing Principles in Telecommunications, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, REGULATION,
AND POLICY (William H. Read & Walt Sapronov eds., forthcoming 1996). Until recently,
little economic research had been done on the properties of these rates. See Alexander C.
Larson, Interconnection and Access Pricing: A Derivation of the Efficient-Component
Pricing Rule (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Jean-Jacques Laffont &
Jean Tirole, Access Pricing and Competition, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 1673 (1994) [hereinafter
Laffont & Tirole, Access Pricing]; John Vickers, Competition and Regulation in Vertically
Related Markets, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1995); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY
SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONY (1994) [hereinafter BAUMOL &
SIDAK, COMPETITION]; William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold
to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994); William B. Tye, Pricing Market Access for
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The rates that prospective entrants must pay to access the LEC
network (for example, to purchase such auxiliary services as directo-
ries, directory assistance, operator services, busy verification and in-
terrupt, and Audiotext), or the terms of interconnection, are
important conditions upon which successful entry today is contin-
gent.100 In deciding whether the terms of interconnection comprise an
entry barrier, three separate cases must be analyzed: (1) terms of in-
Regulated Firms, 29 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV. 39 (1993); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT &
JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 255-258
(1993) [hereinafter LAFFONT & TIROLE, INCENTIVES]; William J. Baumol, Some Subtle
Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT. J. OF TRANSP. ECON. 341 (1983); Robert D.
Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
109 (H.M. Trebing ed., 1979). Existing rigorous models indicate that they should exceed
marginal cost, however. See Laffont & Tirole, Access Pricing, supra, at 1678; see also LAF-
FONT & TIROLE, INCENTIVES, supra, at 266.
Most models of interconnection assume that entrants will enter the market at
whatever interconnection rate they must pay. What complicates the analysis of socially
optimal interconnection rates is a simultaneity problem (i.e., "the chicken or the egg?"):
the rates for interconnection affect the amount of entry, and the amount of entry deter-
mines the socially optimal price of interconnection. In economic terms, one could pose this
problem as one in which the regulator maximizes total surplus (total consumer surplus plus
the profits of both the incumbent monopolist and the entrants) with respect to two choice
variables: the interconnection rate and the optimal allowed number of entrants. Given the
current state of models of entry and competitive interaction in mathematical economics,
this turns out to be a daunting task for the economic theorist.
100. In re Application of SBC Media Ventures, Inc. for Authority to Provide Local
Exchange Telecommunications Service in Montgomery County, Maryland: Hearings on
Case No. 8659 Before the Pub. Serv. Comm. of Md., at 4-5 (Aug. 3, 1994) (prefiled direct
testimony of SBC Media Ventures, Inc. witness Mark K. Armstrong) [hereinafter Arm-
strong Direct Testimony, Case No. 8659].
Examples of network interconnections include traffic exchange arrangements, tandem
subtending arrangements, Signaling System 7 (SS7) inte'connection, and 911 interconnec-
tion. Id. at 4. Cf. Application of MFS Intelenet of Texas, Inc., for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity to Operate as a Local Exchange Company in the Areas Served
by Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. and GTE Southwest, Inc., in Harris, Dallas, Collin,
Tarrant, Bexar, Travis, and El Paso Counties: Hearings on Docket No. 13282 Before the
Pub. Util. Comm. of Tex., at 44-45 (1994) (prefiled direct testimony of MFS Intelenet of
Texas, Inc., witness Susan DeFlorio) (citing operator interfaces, 911 and E-911 systems,
Telecommunications Relay Service, directory listings and directory assistance, CCS inter-
connection, mass announcement/Audiotext platforms, and LEC-controlled telephone
closets and riser cable in multi-tenant buildings as services or facilities to which intercon-
nection must be made available for competitors to offer local service); In re Application of
Teleport Communications Dallas and Teleport Communications Houston, Inc. for a Certif-
icate of Convenience and Necessity and for an Order Requiring Interconnection: Hearings
on Docket No. 13655 Before the Pub. Util. Comm. of Tex., at 32-37 (Nov. 17, 1994)
(prefiled direct testimony of Teleport Communications Group, Inc., witness Steven C. An-
dreassi) (citing direct interconnection to the LECs' networks, tandem subtending arrange-
ments, 911, operator services, directory assistance, 976 traffic, line information database,
SS7, provision of numbering resources, and number portability).
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terconnection are not made available at all, 10 1 (2) terms of intercon-
nection are offered to entrants that consider the terms unacceptable
and choose not to enter, and (3) terms of interconnection are offered
to entrants that accept them and enter the market.
The last case is the easiest to discuss. If terms of interconnection
are offered to entrants, and they accept them and enter the market,
the issue of interconnection rates as entry barriers is moot. In this
case, interconnection rates are not a method by which the incumbent
firm is charging prices in excess of economic costs, while deterring
entry to downstream markets and thereby harming economic welfare.
In the second case, the prospective entrants' refusal to accept the
offered terms of interconnection is not, by itself, an indication that
entry barriers are present. The prospective entrants' refusal tells the
observer nothing conclusive: the terms of interconnection either are,
or are not, an entry barrier. This is because a prospective entrant's
inability to earn positive profits at the offered interconnection rates is
not an indication that the incumbent firm can maintain prices above
economic cost, while deterring entry that otherwise would improve
economic welfare. It is possible that the socially optimal interconnec-
tion rates will not allow positive profits for an entrant because no en-
trant is as efficient as the incumbent firm. If this is so, then "high"
interconnection rates do not have the net effect of a von Weizsdicker
entry barrier, and it is not socially optimal to lower interconnection
rates to accommodate such inefficient entry.
If, however, there is a firm whose entry at socially optimal inter-
connection rates would result in an increase in total economic wel-
fare,1 02  but whose entry is foreclosed by existing higher
interconnection rates, then an entry barrier exists. The central inquiry
is whether interconnection rates are too high to allow the entry of an
efficient and otherwise profitable firm that, if allowed to enter, would
increase total economic welfare and make consumers better off.'0 3
101. In this case, the terms of interconnection could also comprise an unduly high or
infinite price. Either way, it does not follow that any entrant could necessarily enter and
make the market more efficient at lower terms of interconnection. A refusal to deal is thus
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for entry barriers to exist.
102. It is difficult to ascertain this in a regulatory hearing. If this is so, however, then
the optimal number of entrants is greater than the number of entrants currently in the
market, and a von Weizsacker entry barrier exists. Removal of the barrier would result in
an increase in total economic welfare that is the algebraic sum of the change in the incum-
bent firm's profits, the entrant's profits, and the change in consumer surplus in the market.
103. In other words, the question is: Do interconnection rates have a negative net effect
on welfare of a von Weizslcker entry barrier? If the answer is yes, then they comprise an
entry barrier. If the answer is no, then it is difficult to argue persuasively that interconnec-
tion rates constitute an entry barrier. See Alexander C. Larson et al., Competitive Access
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Finally, regarding the first case, an incumbent firm's outright re-
fusal to deal will preclude entry by any prospective entrant, efficient
or not. If efficient firms are precluded from entering the market, the
refusal to deal (absent effective regulation of prices) could have the
effect of a von Weizsdcker entry barrier. If no efficient prospective
entrants exist, however, the refusal to deal may inflict no economic
harm, especially if regulation has already correctly set downstream
market prices at efficient levels. In this case, public policy dictates no
action in the second stage of the Viscusi-Vernon-Harrington entry
barrier analysis, for there is no regulation that would improve social
welfare through "removal" of an "entry barrier." In fact, there is no
von Weizsacker entry barrier to eliminate.
One can conclude that in the absence of regulatory oversight, the
terms of interconnection could be an entry barrier. Whether they are
actual barriers depends on the cost functions of prospective entrants,
the rates and terms of interconnection, and other factors concerning
the ability of entrants to affect post-entry consumer welfare (such as
interaction of the entrants with the incumbent firm with respect to
pricing). Socially optimal interconnection terms should serve as a
check against inefficient entrants and ensure that firms that accept
them can reasonably be expected to increase consumer surplus (e.g.,
through lower prices) in the downstream market. The difficult part, of
course, is knowing what the socially optimal terms of interconnection
are.
B. Is Number Portability an Entry Barrier to the Local Exchange?
It is often contended that "number portability" is an entry barrier
to firms that would otherwise choose to enter the market for local
exchange service.104 To evaluate this contention, it is necessary to
provide an economic analysis of number portability in the context of
entry barriers, and to discuss what number portability is and why it is
contended that firms lacking the ability to offer it to customers face
entry barriers.
Issues and Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J. CoNTEMP. L. 419 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Larson et al., Competitive Access] (for a more detailed discussion of the von Weizsacker
entry barrier as a determinant of "essential facilities.").
If interconnection rates are set using the efficient-component pricing rule, inefficient
entrants are screened from entry, and only competitors at least as efficient as the LEC can
pay interconnection rates and earn positive profits. See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory
Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 201 (1994).
104. See, e.g., Daniel Pearl, Telecommunications: Telephone Numbers Hang Up Local
Bell Rivals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1995, at BI (Midwest ed.); Number Portability Key Barrier
To Local Competition, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 14, 1994, at 4.
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1. What Is Number Portability?
Number portability is the ability of end users to retain their geo-
graphic or non-geographic telephone number when they change their
location, service provider, or service. There are thus three types of
portability: location portability, service provider portability, and ser-
vice portability. Location portability is the ability of an end user to
retain the same geographic or non-geographic telephone number
when moving from one physical location to another. Location porta-
bility allows a subscriber to move across town while retaining the
same telephone number. Service provider portability allows an end
user to retain the same geographic or non-geographic telephone
number when changing from one service provider to another. A cur-
rent example of service provider portability is 800 toll free service.
Service portability allows an end user to retain the same geographic or
non-geographic telephone number when changing from one type of
service to another. Service portability occurs, for example, when a
service subscriber changes service from basic local exchange service
("plain old telephone service," or POTS) to Integrated Services Digi-
tal Network (ISDN). Commentators on local exchange competition
who use the term "number portability" normally mean the term ser-
vice provider portability as defined above.
2. Number Portability as an Entry Barrier
The inability to offer service provider portability is allegedly an
entry barrier for new entrants to the local exchange. The reasoning
behind this contention is that the lack of service provider portability
of new entrants may make their local service unattractive to LEC sub-
scribers who do not want to change their telephone numbers when
they change service providers. This makes it unduly difficult, so the
argument goes, for an otherwise efficient entrant to get subscribers to
switch to its local service offering. Stated another way, inability to
offer service provider portability is allegedly a cost borne by entrants,
though not incumbent LECs, and which discourages entry by efficient
entrants.
True service provider portability would enable a competing local
exchange carrier to allow customers to retain their telephone numbers
without relying on the routing of calls through the incumbent LEC's
end office, where the "End-Office-Code" (NXX) is assigned.
Although members of the industry disagree about the best way to es-
tablish true service provider portability, interim solutions have been
established, including remote call forwarding and direct inward dial-
ing. Both solutions enable customers to change providers without
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changing telephone numbers, but rely on the incumbent LEC's net-
work to process all calls. 10 5
If service provider portability is a true entry barrier,10 6 then it
must follow that, because prospective entrants lack service provider
portability, the incumbent suppliers of basic local exchange service
can maintain or exercise significant market power in that market.
Among other possibilities, if existing subscribers of the LECs do not
see the competitive offerings of new entrants as viable alternatives to
existing LEC service because the new entrant cannot offer service
provider portability, service provider portability indeed may be an en-
try barrier. The key question is whether incumbent firms; because of
the service provider portability problem, can charge prices that exceed
competitive levels for significant periods of time before they must
lower those prices. In other words, does prospective entrants' lack of
service provider portability give incumbent firms significant market
power?
To answer this question, one must recognize that the telecommu-
nications industry is replete with asymmetries among firms. Some,
such as the MFJ, are entry barriers while others are not. Some of
these asymmetries prevent more efficient firm behavior. The key
question, then, is whether service provider portability constitutes a
true entry barrier (i.e., a condition that precludes efficient prospective
entrants to the detriment of economic efficiency), or whether it is
merely an asymmetry between firms that does not constitute an entry
barrier.
Without hard empirical data on consumer demand for local ser-
vice (with and without service provider portability) at various prices, it
is difficult to determine whether service provider portability consti-
tutes an entry barrier. To answer this question, it is necessary to ex-
amine what prices consumers would have to pay for local exchange
telephone service from carriers that do and do not offer service pro-
vider portability. If prospective customers of local service would buy
local service without service provider portability, but at a lower price
than service that includes it, and if efficient entrants can at least break
even at these prices, then service provider portability is not an entry
barrier. Rather, it is merely a gradation of service quality. A useful
analogy exists in the market for intraLATA long distance, where the
cheaper service may require the customer to dial more digits when
making calls. The dialing disparity is obviously not an entry barrier.
105. Experimental work is still being done in this area. See Industry Group Proposes
First "True" Number Portability Plan, COMM. DAILY, May 10, 1995, at 2.
106. That is, in the von Weizsacker sense of the concept. See supra note 94.
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The lack of service provider portability in local exchange markets may
be no more an entry barrier than dialing disparities are in intraLATA
long distance markets. It is not possible to know whether service pro-
vider portability is an entry barrier until consumers are faced with the
array of services (with and without service provider portability) and
the corresponding prices offered by various carriers.
It seems unlikely, however, that service provider portability acts
as an entry barrier. An examination of actual or planned entry into
local exchange markets, and consideration of other telecommunica-
tions markets in which the issue of service provider portability (or
similar technological asymmetries) has been present, demonstrates
that service provider portability is not a true entry barrier.
As an example, consider first the market for cellular telephone
service. Currently, there is no service provider portability between
cellular carriers; if subscribers wish to change their cellular carrier,
they cannot retain their telephone numbers. Despite this fact, there is
a surprisingly high rate of turnover among cellular carriers: approxi-
mately 1.8% to 2.5% per month. 10 7 These figures indicate there is a
significant number of users in the cellular telephone market for whom
the lack of service provider portability does not discourage selection
of a different carrier. To the extent that this attribute is also true of
subscribers to more traditional landline-based dialtone service, service
provider portability is not likely to be an entry barrier.
Second, the experience of 800 service and service provider porta-
bility offers some important insights. Prior to 1986, LECs were able to
provide access for 800 service only to AT&T. In 1986, however, the
LECs introduced 800 access service that could be used by any IXC.
At first, LECs provided this access through an interim 800 service ar-
rangement known as the "End-Office Code" (NXX) plan. Under the
NXX plan, there was no service provider portability. Customers wish-
ing to change their carrier service had to change their 800 number
because each IXC was assigned a unique set of NXX numbers; LEC
switches screened each 800 service call and associated it with the ap-
propriate carrier. Service provider portability, usually called "800
number portability," did not become available until May 1, 1993. De-
spite the lack of service provider portability in the market for 800 ser-
vice, significant entry into this market occurred. In August 1986 only
seventeen companies nationwide offered 800 service, but by Septem-
107. MTA EMCI, Inc., U.S. Cellular Marketplace: 1994, at 35 (Oct. 1994) (on file with
the author).
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ber 1989 that number had increased to 146.118 If entry is occurring,
entry barriers do not exist.
Third, prospective entrants to the local exchange market such as
Network MCI and Sprint have announced their intentions to invest
several billion dollars in local exchange networks, but have not condi-
tioned this investment on service provider portability. If service pro-
vider portability were a true entry barrier, prospective entrants would
not be planning to make such huge investments (a significant propor-
tion of which may be sunk costs) before the service provider portabil-
ity issue is resolved.
C. Entry in the Context of the 1992 Merger Guidelines
The terms "committed entry" and "uncommitted entry," from the
1992 Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Merger
Guidelines (Merger Guidelines), help clarify the economics of entry
into telephone markets.
1. Uncommitted Entry
According to the 1992 Merger Guidelines, "uncommitted en-
trants" are firms that are not currently producing or selling the rele-
vant product in the relevant area but are considered participants in
the relevant market because their inclusion in the market definition
more accurately reflects probable supply responses. The supply re-
sponses of uncommitted entrants:
must be likely to occur within one year and without the expenditure
of significant sunk costs of entry and exit, in response to a 'small but
significant and nontransitory' price increase. If a firm has the tech-
nological capability to achieve such an uncommitted supply re-
sponse, but likely would not (e.g., because difficulties in achieving
product acceptance, distribution, or production would render such a
response unprofitable), that firm will not be considered a market
participant.1 9
Thus, a potential entrant is included in the uncommitted category
if, in response to a price increase of five percent (typically) lasting one
year and without the expenditure of significant sunk costs, it would
108. David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Competition for 800 Service: An Economic
Evaluation, 15 TELECOMM. POL'Y 395, 404 (1991).
109. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992), 4 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) 1 13,104, at 20,573-3 [hereinafter
Merger Guidelines]. Sunk costs are defined as follows: "Sunk costs are the acquisition
costs of tangible and intangible assets that cannot be recovered through the redeployment
of these assets outside the relevant market, i.e., costs uniquely incurred to supply the rele-
vant product and geographic market." Id. at 20,573-3 to 20,573-4. In economics, sunk costs
are usually defined as "costs that (in some short or intermediate run) cannot be eliminated,
even by total cessation of production." BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 50, at 280.
1995]
likely supply products in the relevant market within one year. Any
new steps necessary for the production of the relevant products must
take less than one year and must require only insignificant sunk costs.
2. Committed Entry
"Committed entry" is defined as new competition that requires
expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry and exit. A three-step
assessment is used to evaluate whether committed entry would deter
or counteract a competitive effect of concern: (1) whether entry can
achieve significant market impact within a timely period, (2) whether
committed entry would be profitable and hence a likely response to a
merger having competitive effects of concern, and (3) whether timely
and likely entry would be sufficient to return market prices to their
premerger levels.110
3. Relationship of Merger Guidelines to Potential Entry into Local
Exchange Markets
For purposes of analysis, assume that the existing LECs resulted
from the merger of two or more firms. If so, for the Merger Guide-
lines, the overarching question would be: Would timely entry with sig-
nificant sunk costs be able, at premerger prices and at a flexibly small
scale, to cover long-run costs (including the return on investment con-
sistent with the risks that sunk costs will be lost), and consequently
replace the competition that may have been lost from a merger?111 In
other words, could entry induced by such a hypothetical merger disci-
pline the prices of the merged firm in a way that prevents it from
exercising market power?
Depending on the levels of sunk costs they must incur, new en-
trants to the local exchange could fall into either entry category in the
Merger Guidelines. For example, in the British experience, the rapid
entry of cable companies into telephony indicates that the cable com-
panies could easily have been uncommitted entrants with the ability to
fluidly move in and out of supplying the products in the relevant mar-
ket: telephony.112 Either directly or through their subsidiaries, cable
companies in the United States have supplied services that compete
with LEC special access services.' 3 Unlike the British experience,
110. Merger Guidelines, supra note 109, at 20,573-9.
111. Robert D. Willig, The Role of Sunk Costs in the 1992 Guidelines' Entry Analysis, 6
ANTITRUST 23, 25 (Summer 1992).
112. This statement is subject to the caveats raised supra note 18.
113. For example, TCI owns Teleport Communications Group, which provides telecom-
munications services in direct competition with LECs.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:1
however, little observed entry of cable companies into residential tele-
phone markets has taken place in the U.S.
Nevertheless, if a cable company has built an appropriate fiber
trunk network, the additional electronics required to provide voice te-
lephony can be installed quickly.'14 Under such circumstances, it is a
straightforward conclusion that cable companies are committed en-
trants to telephony markets under the Merger Guidelines."- Com-
mitted entry induced by a horizontal merger will deter or counteract
any increase in market power that would otherwise accrue to the
merged firms only if the entry is: (1) timely (generally having signifi-
cant market impact within two years); (2) likely to occur because it is
profitable; and (3) of sufficient magnitude, character, and scope to re-
turn prices to premerger levels. 1 6 Committed entrants must expect
their post entry prices to cover their long-run costs, and their mini-
mum viable scale must be no larger than the "sales opportunities
available to entrants. 1" 7
D. Summary
In summary, the two-stage approach to entry barrier analysis dis-
cussed above is useful in analyzing whether a particular condition is an
entry barrier and whether public policy is likely to lower existing bar-
riers. If entry takes place in a telecommunications market, such as
residence basic local exchange service, the LEC cannot maintain price
above economic cost while deterring entry. Although residence local
exchange service, in total, is likely a subsidized service whose rates
have been set by the state public utility commission to be reasonable
and affordable, entry may take place in selected geographic markets
despite the requirement of subsidies designed to foster universal
service.
114. See generally In re General Investigation into Competition within the Telecommuni-
cations Industry in the State of Kansas: Hearings on Docket No. 190,492-U Before the Cor-
poration Commission of the State of Kansas, at 26 (Oct. 7, 1994) (prefiled direct testimony
of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. witness Lawrence K. Vanston) [hereinafter Vanston
Direct Testimony].
115. Not all cable companies have the necessary fiber trunk network in place to offer
telephony immediately. Dr. Vanston estimates that by 1999 most U.S. telephone subscrib-
ers will have access to cable-provided telephone services. Vanston Direct Testimony, supra
note 114, at 26. However, the application for a CCN filed by SBC Media Ventures in the
State of Maryland indicated that providing telephony over the cable network would take
place much quicker than the two-year time frame for committed entry in the Merger
Guidelines.
116. Willig, supra note 111, at 25.
117. Merger Guidelines, supra note 109, at 20,573-11.
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It is interesting that many policy analysts consider entry barriers
to local exchange a foregone conclusion, although few factors serve as
true potential entry barriers (in the economic sense). One potential
factor is the lack of socially optimal interconnection rates. For inter-
connection rates to be an entry barrier, however, standard "leverage
theory" must be accorded a level of credibility that it does not
deserve.
A second factor is the inability to obtain a CCN at all. Because
the lack of a CCN is an absolute proscription on entry, it can be an
entry barrier if efficient firms are prevented from entering the market
and increasing aggregate economic welfare. The potential lack of effi-
cient interconnection rates is clearly the more difficult of these two
potential entry barriers to ameliorate. While it is relatively easy to
issue a CCN to a prospective entrant, arriving at appropriate intercon-
nection rates could be much more difficult.
All of this leads to a rather surprising conclusion: in the presence
of a prospective entrant (such as a cable company), that can obtain a
CCN and earn profits after paying socially optimal interconnection
rates, the local exchange market is quite likely to be contestable.
Many analysts would have considered this conclusion ludicrous even
one year ago. u1 8 Cable TV facilities are now nearly as widespread as
existing telephone service, so these conditions are not confined to
those areas in which entry may soon be observed, such as Montgom-
ery County, Maryland, or parts of New York City.
The dearth of entry barriers to the local service market has one
obvious and important implication for regulation: one must seriously
question whether LECs would have market power in the local ex-
change in the absence of public utility regulation. If basic local ex-
change service were deregulated overnight and the LECs could charge
what they please, it is doubtful that they could raise prices to supra-
competitive levels before entry caused them to rescind the price in-
creases. This again questions the basic premise behind the MFJ: that
the RBOCs have market power borne of natural monopoly.
118. In the British experience, it took SBC CableComms only eight months to overlay a
telephone network onto its cable network. See supra note 18. This is an expedient entry
indeed, especially in view of the Merger Guidelines, which state that timely entry can take
as long as two years. Merger Guidelines, supra note 109, at 21,573-10.
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V
Other Policy Recommendations Arising from Entry
into Local Exchange Markets
A. Regulation Should Be Modified Both to Prepare for Entry into Local
Exchange Markets and to Recognize Actual and Potential
Competitors That Enter the Market
Because competition is both beneficial and inevitable in telecom-
munications industry, its desirability is not at issue. The issue is how
best to make the transition from a regulated to a competitive market-
place. The state regulation of LEC services sold in markets subject to
competitive entry should be re-evaluated.
Prior to entry into local exchange markets, LECs should be
granted, through public utility law, the ability to change prices flexi-
bly, allowing them to compete on the merits with prospective entrants.
If incumbent LECs have the same downward pricing flexibility as
their rivals, efficient firms are more likely to enter than inefficient
firms buoyed by laws or policies that proscribe legitimate and eco-
nomically efficient pricing responses to LEC competition.119 If such
pricing flexibility exists prior to entry, the observation of entry itself
indicates the likelihood that the incumbent firm is not quantity sus-
tainable, and hence not a natural monopoly.
Thus, two events should trigger changes in regulation. First,
when competition is initially made possible in the local exchange mar-
ket, regulation should immediately be adjusted to provide neither the
entrant nor the incumbent LEC any net advantage on a forward-look-
ing basis. Second, when competitive forces effectively constrain the
prices of the regulated firm in a market, regulation of those prices is
no longer useful and should be curtailed. 2 °
B. State Regulatory Policies Designed to Foster Competition Should
Address Potential Entry Barriers in Conformity with the
Mainstream Economic Definition
In state regulatory proceedings, competition policy-formulation
normally addresses the question of "entry barriers," usually defined as
119. See discussion infra Part V.C.
120. Richard Schmalensee, Economic Principles for Classifying Telecommunications
Services as Competitive or Emerging Competitive (Oct. 17, 1994) (prefiled position paper of
Southern New England Telephone Company witness Richard Schmalensee, in Develop-
ment of the Assumptions, Tests, Analysis, and Review to Govern Telecommunications Ser-
vice Reclassification in Light of the 8 Criteria Set Forth in Section 6 of Public Act 94-83:
Hearings on Docket No. 94-07-02 Before the Department of Public Utility Control of the
State of Connecticut).
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some subset of the conditions that make entry more difficult than it
otherwise would be. Specifically, state competition policies designed
to foster "competition" address whether there are any "entry barri-
ers" to telecommunications markets, what these "barriers" are, and
how a state public utility commission can enact regulations to lower
them. Beyond the issues of interconnection rates or CCNs, specific
state regulatory policies designed to foster entry into telecommunica-
tions markets (such as imputation policies or the abolition of resale
restrictions) or other related policies, are not necessary to encourage
efficient entrants to serve local telephone markets.
Similarly, policies that employ expansive definitions of entry bar-
riers or essential facilities and mandate access to the broadly defined
facilities assumed "essential" to lessen entry barriers are not neces-
sary. In fact, such policies are likely to be more harmful to the public
interest than helpful. The only "competition" that should be fostered
through state regulatory policies is welfare-improving competition on
the merits. Given this assumption, only true economic entry barriers,
if they exist, need to be removed to make the competitive process
possible.
C. Equal Pricing Flexibility for All Market Suppliers Is Essential to the
Public Interest
Pricing flexibility is the ability to engage in a variety of pricing
methods (e.g., volume and term discounts, optional multipart tariffs,
customer-specific pricing, "density zone" pricing, etc.) that are
equivalent to those used by one's competitors. Pricing flexibility is an
essential policy if the full benefits of competition are to accrue to con-
sumers. Pricing flexibility is a valuable policy tool because it enables
the regulator to know what entry really indicates about the market.121
Thus, establishing telecommunications law that affords pricing flexibil-
ity at entry to all firms servicing the market is a valuable policy. Once
entry has emerged in a local exchange market, pricing flexibility
should be granted, if it has not already been done, to LECs, so they
are able to set prices in the same manner as their competitors. 122
121. See discussion supra part II.B.
122. See Greenwald & Sharkey, supra note 49, at 333 ("[I]f the prices of an established
[LEC] are kept too high because it is not permitted downward price flexibility, then the
economic consequences are more strongly negative. Under these circumstances, the
[LEC], despite the fact that it is the most efficient service provider, would be displaced by
less efficient competitors from the market in question. In theory, the entire demand for
service would be diverted to these competitors. Thus, not only would consumer demand
be driven below its economically efficient level, but this demand would be satisfied entirely
by inefficient alternative suppliers."). Moreover, such handicapping could become a rela-
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Once competitive pressures exist, pricing flexibility is an impor-
tant ingredient in the competitive process and is absolutely necessary
if the competitive process is to yield the maximum benefits to consum-
ers. Competition cannot occur if the pricing decisions of firms are
regulated asymmetrically. An important aspect of the competitive
process in any market is the firms' interactions in attempting to offer
more attractive prices and higher quality service than their rivals.
Asymmetric constraints on price discounting behavior merely serve to
impede this aspect of the competitive process, to the ultimate detri-
ment of consumers.
With the advent of entry, regulatory agencies should strive to
eliminate unnecessary pricing constraints on LECs with respect to
their competitors. The emergence of competition should serve as the
trigger for this process. Once competitive pressures on LEC services
are present, regulation should afford the same degree of pricing flexi-
bility to all firms in the market. If entrants know that the LEC will
possess pricing flexibility post-entry, only efficient entrants will be at-
tracted to the market, and observed successful entry implies that the
incumbent firm is not quantity sustainable and hence not a natural
monopoly.123
In practical terms, this means that several current pricing prac-
tices will have to end if there is to be local exchange competition.
These pricing practices include: (1) statewide average rates for basic
local exchange service;124 (2) the residual pricing of residence local
exchange service; and (3) value-of-service pricing which drives a
wedge between the prices of local service paid by residence and busi-
ness customers, even though the services purchased by each customer
group are essentially equal. Under local exchange competition, the
prices for local service to business and residence customers should be
expected to converge.
tively permanent fixture in the marketplace. Note that the above quote presupposes that
the LEC is the most efficient provider. The negative aspects of proscribed downward pric-
ing flexibility are most pronounced when there is no downward pricing flexibility and the
LEC is, in fact, the most efficient supplier.
123. See discussion supra Part II.A.
124. Most LECs do not have to charge one rate for all local service subscribers in the
entire state. The basic tariff rates differ by exchange, or "rate group," with smaller ex-
changes (usually rural) paying far less than larger exchanges. Within metro areas, the local
service tariffs usually have so-called "tiers," and the price for each tier is different. There is
often little variation in the prices across tiers. As local exchange competition becomes a
reality, the ability to deviate from the tier prices and to deaverage rates across rate groups
will become important.
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D. Regulation Should Not Preclude the Economies of Scope Resulting
from Vertical Relationships
With the entry of new suppliers into the local exchange, it is im-
portant that regulation not preclude the formation of industry suppli-
ers who have the necessary scope economies required to be efficient
competitors. Scope economies are the economies accruing to the joint
production of services versus the production of those same services by
separate plants or firms. It is clear that the firms now collaborating to
enter the local exchange markets will have significant scope econo-
mies when combined and functioning as a local exchange provider.
For example, AT&T has acquired McCaw, which provides cellular
services, and Sprint has formed a venture with major cable television
firms (and was the high bidder at the recently concluded personal
communications service (PCS) spectrum auctions). However, there is
one law and one consent decree which, if not changed, will preclude
the formation of additional partnerships or mergers promoting scope
economies: the Cable Act of 1984125 and the MFJ.
The MFJ, as discussed earlier, prevents the RBOCs from entering
the interLATA long distance market. The Cable Act of 1984 contains
telco-cable cross-ownership restrictions.'26 Under the Cable Act of
1984, it is unlawful for any common carrier to provide: (1) video pro-
gramming directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either
directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, con-
trolled by, or under common control with the common carrier;127 or
(2) channels of communications or pole line conduit space, or other
rental arrangements, to any entity which is directly or indirectly
owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with
the common carrier, if such facilities or arrangements are to be used
for, or in connection with, the provision of video programming di-
rectly to subscribers in the telephone service area of the common car-
rier. Both the Cable Act of 1984 and the MFJ prevent the RBOCs
125. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
[hereinafter Cable Act of 1984].
126. Under the Cable Act of 1984, common carriers are prohibited from providing
video programming to subscribers in their telephone service areas, either directly or indi-
rectly through an affiliate. Likewise, they cannot provide channels of communications or
pole line conduit space, or other rental arrangements to any affiliated entity, if such facili-
ties or arrangements are to be used in provisioning video programming directly to sub-
scribers in their telephone areas. Id. The Cable Act of 1984 exempts any common carrier
to the extent such carrier provides telephone exchange service in any rural area (as defined
by the FCC) and allows for waivers in those areas where provision of video programming
directly to subscribers through a cable system demonstrably could not exist except through
a cable system owned by or affiliated with the common carrier. Id.
127. Id. § 613(b)(1).
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from forming the types of efficient vertical relationships that other
firms demonstrably plan to use in entering the local exchange.
With the advent of local exchange competition in the provision of
telecommunications and vertically related services, it is necessary to
reform telecommunications law to allow efficient scope economies to
form from all sources. As industries converge and the local exchange
market becomes competitive, the importance of scope economies be-
comes even greater than before. The RBOCs have long possessed
scope economies, but competing consortia of firms have their own
unique economies as well.
If local exchange competition is to provide the greatest benefit to
consumers, it is essential that all firms be able to employ the scope
economies they can realize through vertical relationships. To the ex-
tent that joint production of cable and telephony (or other conver-
gences of industries) yields scope economies, effective competition
against firms employing such joint production may require that rivals
be similarly vertically integrated. The Cable Act of 1984 and the MFJ,
however, may prevent the formation of firms possessing such econo-
mies. Laws such as the Cable Act of 1984 or MFJ, which unduly re-
strict the development and employment of scope economies, will
reduce the benefits from local exchange competition and may reduce
the benefits of competition in related markets, such as interLATA
long distance.
Thus, the time is right to take a hard look at the impact the Cable
Act of 1984 and MFJ have on the formation of efficient, vertically
integrated firms that can provide local exchange competition.128
128. Several courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to hold that 47 U.S.C. § 533(b),
a provision of the Cable Act of 1984, is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. See
US West v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), affg 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D.
Wash.); Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 48 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994) (reaching same
decision based on US West); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d
181 (4th Cir. 1994), affg 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993); Ameritech Corp. v. United
States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Bellsouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
The United States Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on the first such
case, Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 932 (E.D.
Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995). See also
NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. 93-323-P-C (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994), appeal filed, No.
95-1183 (1st Cir.); United States Tel. Ass'n v. United States, No. 1:94CV01961 (D.D.C. Feb
14, 1995), appeal filed, No. 95-10478 (5th Cir.); Southern New England Tel. Co. v. United
States, No. 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 1995).
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E. Optional Multipart Tariffs Should Be Allowed in LEC Pricing of
Local Service
Basic local exchange service of the LECs is highly regulated and
usually sold at a monthly flat rate for both network access and unlim-
ited local usage. This rate structure prices local usage at zero; the cus-
tomer's usage cannot affect his total outlay in purchasing the service.
Further, regulation has often set the flat rate price of local service
"residually," at levels that fail to cover the combined costs of both
access and usage. In addition, in some states regulators, and even leg-
islators, have proscribed or discouraged the use of "local measured
service" (LMS): the pricing of local service in a way which allows the
separate pricing of network access and usage.
With the advent of new entrants to the local exchange market,
the usage-based pricing of local service may offer greater advantages
for public policy. To realize these advantages, however, state regula-
tory agencies must either allow LMS or raise the flat rate for basic
local exchange service. 129
Regulation that requires LECs to price their local exchange ser-
vice at flat rates, and only at flat rates, can cause two problems in an
era of multiple suppliers of local exchange service: (1) it may unduly
handicap LECs in making legitimate pricing responses to competition
and hence impede the true competitive process once entry takes
place;130 and (2) because the efficient levels of a flat-rated offering
129. This point is well known but was probably first raised by economist John Wenders.
John T. Wenders, Natural Monopoly and the Deregulation of Local Telephone Service, 14
TELECOMM. POL'Y 125, 133 n.13 (Apr. 1990) (arguing that rate deaveraging would proba-
bly force LECs to phase out flat rate service, since competitors offering measured rates to
low-use customers would force LECs to also offer measured service and raise flat rate
prices).
130. See John T. Wenders, Two Views of Applied Welfare Analysis: The Case of Local
Telephone Service Pricing, 57 S. ECON. J. 340 (1990) (arguing that strict flat-rate pricing is
unsustainable in a competitive environment). But see David L. Kaserman et al., 7vo Views
of Applied Welfare Analysis: Comment, 60 S. ECON. J. 822 (1993) (arguing that unsub-
sidized flat rate telephone prices may be sustainable against entrants offering LMS and
hence that Wenders' conclusion does not generalize under plausible assumptions on cost
conditions pervasive in telecommunications); John T. Wenders, Two Views of Applied Wel-
fare Analysis: Reply, 60 S. ECON. J. 828 (1993).
To illustrate the point being made, consider the example in which the LECs are al-
lowed to price local service only through one flat rate. If so, then (depending on cost and
demand conditions) a competitor can select a price consisting of a monthly access fee lower
than the LEC's flat rate price and a per-minute fee for usage. Properly set, such a tariff
would lure all of the low-use customers away from the LEC and leave the LEC with rela-
tively unremunerative high-use customers who still get to pay what, for them, is a relatively
low flat rate. If such a tariff were set correctly, the low-use customers would have a lower
monthly bill than the flat rate mandated by regulation.
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should be higher than the current flat rates of the LECs,'131 it may
unduly impede the efficient pricing of local service even after entry
has taken place.
Consider the first of the problems cited above: to see why such
regulations on pricing may handicap the LECs, note that new entrants
to the local exchange market are not likely to choose inflexible pricing
methods, such as offering a single flat rate price. 132 This is because
local exchange service users have widely differing usage patterns;
some make intensive use of their phones, others have very low usage.
Entrants will most likely prefer to use optional multipart tariffs, which
would unbundle access to and usage of the network and offer several
different pricing plans for users with widely differing usage character-
istics. For example, the low-use customer may prefer a pricing
method in which the flat monthly access fee is relatively low, but the
usage fee is relatively high; the high-use customer would select an op-
tion which includes a relatively high fee to gain access to the network,
but in which the price per minute of usage is relatively low.
Allowing the LECs to use optional multipart tariffs would en-
courage earnest competition on the merits and enable the LECs to
curtail needless financial losses due only to their inability to set prices
in the same way as their competitors. Such LEC pricing would be no
different from that now observed in cellular service markets, which
are unregulated.
To see why the second problem is of concern, note that the cur-
rent flat rate pricing of local service is at relatively low rates to foster
universal service. Even without prospective entrants to the local ex-
change market, it could be more efficient to price local service using
several optional multipart tariffs. 133 If this method were used, the flat
131. See Alexander C. Larson et al., The Effect of Subscriber Line Charges on Residen-
tial Telephone Bills, 13 TELECOMM. POL'Y 337 (Dec. 1989) [hereinafter Larson et al., Sub-
scriber Line Charges]; Steve G. Parsons, The Economic Necessity of an Increased
Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) in Telecommunications, ADMIN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996)
[hereinafter Parsons].
132. Application of MFS Intelenet of Texas, Inc. for a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity to Operate as a Local Exchange Company in the Areas Served by Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company and GTE Southwest, Inc. in Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, Travis,
and El Paso Counties: Hearings on Docket No. 13282 Before the Public Utility Commission
of Texas, at 19 (Oct. 3, 1994) (prefiled direct testimony of MFS Intelenet of Texas, Inc.,
witness Susan DeFlorio) (arguing that facility termination charges should be set equal to
long-run incremental cost) ("Although it is likely that ... [MFS Intelenet of Texas, Inc.]
will offer at least one flat rate service option, we also intend to offer other rate structures
for local usage that will meet customer needs and demands.").
133. The economics literature has not produced many studies of usage-based pricing of
local service, and results have been mixed. The study conducted by Griffin and Mayor
concluded that going from a regime of flat rate pricing to measured rate pricing of local
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rate offering of the LECs would likely have to be raised considerably
for two reasons: (1) to increase efficiency by migrating customers to
the multipart tariffs that are more in line with the costs incurred by
their service, and (2) to ensure that the flat rate comes closer to offset-
ting the costs of high-use customers, who will no doubt select it as
their method of paying for local service.134 Similar to incumbent
LECs, even efficient entrants may prefer to set the optional fiat rate
price higher than the LEC's current flat rate offering. The efficient
entrants, however, are precluded from doing so. If left as is, the
LEC's flat rate offering will "dominate" (i.e., in economic terms, will
always require a smaller outlay from the customer) any efficient flat
rate offering an entrant would choose to use. Thus, while regulation
requiring low LEC flat rates does not appear to preclude entry, it
could impede the efficient pricing of local service after entry has taken
place.
Thus, with entry into the local exchange market, LECs should be
allowed to raise flat rate local service prices135 and use a variety of
optional multipart tariffs in pricing local service.
telephone calls would yield efficiency gains. James M. Griffin & Thomas H. Mayor, The
Welfare Gain from Efficient Pricing of Local Telephone Services, 30 J.L. & ECON. 465, 482-
83 (1987). The study conducted by Park and Mitchell concluded that, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, measured rate pricing of local telephone calls is likely to be somewhat less.
efficient than traditional flat rate pricing. Rolla Edward Park & Bridger M. Mitchell, Opti-
mal Peak-Load Pricing for Local Telephone Calls 1987 RAND PUBLICATION SERIES
(RAND Monograph R-3404-1-RC, Mar. 1987).
134. In fact, there may not be a stable fiat rate that charges the flat rate-paying group
its full marginal costs. Bridger M. Mitchell, Economic Issues in Local Measured Service, in
PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL MEASURED SERVICE 41, 50 (Joseph A. Baude et al. eds., 1979).
This is because each time a flat rate is revised upward, only the high-use customers will
choose it. However, depending on the readiness of customers to pay a premium for flat
rate service and on the distribution of local usage, an increase in the flat rate may achieve
an equilibrium in which flat rate users, as a group, do cover their full marginal costs. Id. at
51.
135. This assumes that universal service objectives, if jeopardized by higher local rates,
can be met and preserved with a targeted subsidy such as so-called "Lifeline" rates or
through other means. The recovery of non-traffic sensitive costs of the local exchange
network could be realized through increased local exchange rates or through increases in
the federal subscriber line charge. See Larson et al., Subscriber Line Charges, supra note
131; Parsons, supra note 131, for background material on subscriber line charges (SLCs).
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F. Comprehensive Unbundling Policies Are Not Necessary to Foster
Entry into Local Telecommunications Markets
It is often argued in various public forums136 and academic writ-
ings 137 that unbundling policies (or nondiscriminatory access to "bot-
tleneck" facilities) are required before local exchange competition can
take place. Unbundling is the process by which an LEC's network is
disaggregated into functional components. There may be some merit
to this argument. All too often, however, the argument is stretched so
the term "unbundling" is interpreted as comprehensive unbundling,
with no regard for whether compelled access to unbundled facilities
can improve economic efficiency in a given market. A comprehensive
unbundling policy requires an LEC to make all or nearly all "bun-
dled" features and functions of its network available separately to
prospective entrants at nondiscriminatory, tariffed prices.138 Like the
British experience, however, the entry now occurring indicates that
unbundling the network to such an extent is not a prerequisite for
local exchange competition. Though new entrants to the local ex-
change may require interconnection to various services such as 911,
operator services, Signalling System 7, and other services or facilities,
normally they neither require nor request that the LEC's network be
unbundled comprehensively as a condition for entry. These facts pro-
136. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief for the FCC, In re Unbundling of Local Exchange Car-
rier Common Line Facilities, (RM-8614) (Petition for Rulemaking) (filed by MFS Commu-
nications Company, Inc. on March 7, 1995) (requesting the FCC to adopt a nationwide
policy on local loop unbundling). Specifically, the MFS Petition requested that the FCC
adopt rules requiring each Tier 1 LEC to: (1) provide unbundled loops in any study area in
which the state public utility commission has authorized local exchange competition; (2)
permit interconnection to such loops via tariffed expanded interconnection arrangements
consistent with those already in place for special and switched access; (3) comply with
uniform minimum technical and operational criteria, so that both incumbents and new
entrants can be assured of compatibility between their respective networks; and (4) estab-
lish cost-based pricing guidelines, i.e., prohibit LECs from charging more for the interstate
component of unbundled loops than they charge end-users for the same service. The MFS
view of unbundled loops as a prerequisite to local exchange competition is not shared by
all CAPs. For example, Teleport Communications Group's (TCG's) Senior Vice President
of Regulatory and External Affairs, Bob Atkinson, argued that TCG alternatives to the
LECs' local loops can be used: "Unbundling isn't as crucial as it once was because there
now are ways of entering local service other than using LEC network." MFS Petitions FCC
to Set Nationwide Policy on Local Loop Unbundling, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 8, 1995, at 3, 4.
Atkinson cited "building one's own network, using cable or wireless carriers." Id.
137. See, e.g., BAUMOL & SIDAK, COMPETITION, supra note 99, at 124; See also Alfred
E. Kahn, Can Regulation and Competition Coexist? Solutions to the Stranded Cost Prob-
lem and Other Conundra, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 1994, at 23, 25.
138. See Alexander C. Larson & Margarete Z. Starkey, Unbundling Issues and U.S.
Telecommunications Policy, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 83 (1994) for further discussion of
unbundling issues.
19951
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
vide strong empirical evidence that comprehensive unbundling is not
necessary for local exchange competition.
In economic terms, whether an "essential facility" exists in an up-
stream, or wholesale, telecommunications market depends completely
on its effect on the competitive process in downstream, or retail, mar-
kets. An upstream facility that has been made more costly to
purchase due to a bundling arrangement can be an essential facility
only if, absent unbundling, the competitive process in a downstream
market is eliminated or forestalled absolutely. Under the economic
criterion of efficiency, the failure of a vertically integrated firm to un-
bundle upstream productive inputs used or required by firms to pro-
vide downstream competition is not a prima facie indicator that some
of the bundled upstream inputs are "essential." Further, the fact that
downstream firms can increase their profits if unbundling occurs is
immaterial, since it may or may not enhance economic efficiency. Nor
is it necessary to expect a vertically integrated firm to increase its costs
by unbundling, just to make previously bundled upstream facilities ac-
cessible to its downstream rivals.139
Thus, for a bundled upstream facility to be "essential" under the
economic efficiency criterion, it must act as an economic entry barrier
to a given downstream, or retail, market due to being bundled with
some other service. This result requires at least three necessary (but
not sufficient) conditions to hold true: (1) the absolute requirement
that an entrant have physical access to the "essential" facility to pro-
vide service at all, (2) a welfare-enhancing competitive process cannot
operate properly in the downstream market unless efficient entrants
have access to the upstream facility, and (3) the "essential" facility is
available only from a monopolist or consortium of firms acting as a
monopolist and no other source. At a minimum, essentiality in eco-
nomic terms requires the bundling (and resulting pricing) or the de
facto withholding of an upstream productive input to be a von Weiz-
sacker entry barrier to the downstream market.1 40
Recent court cases involving refusals to deal and essential facili-
ties have supported the economic criterion behind essentiality dis-
139. To see this point, consider the hypothetical example of a local brewery that con-
trols the city's water supply. Assume that this brewery believes it can maximize its profits
by refusing to sell water to its competitors, and by monopolizing the beer market, charging
$10 per six-pack. If a regulatory or antitrust authority were to use unbundling as a tool to
make the beer market more competitive, what should be unbundled? In the context of this
simplified example, the answer is clear: the authority would mandate access only to the
water but would have no need to unbundle all of the production processes of the brewery
itself.
140. See supra note 103.
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cussed in this article. 141 For example, in Flip Side Productions, Inc. v.
Jam Productions, Ltd., the court ruled that one firm's resource is not
vital to competition if an alternative is available to rivals from other
sources. 42 Further, Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that a resource is
not essential if competitors can operate effectively without it. For a
resource to be essential, it must be not only helpful, but vital to com-
petitive survival. 143 Note that even this constitutes broader criteria for
essentiality than the economic criteria discussed above, since the fail-
ure of competitors to survive may not impair a market's economic
efficiency. In Twin Laboratories,'44 the court ruled that to establish
the existence of an essential facility, a would-be rival must show more
than inconvenience or even some economic loss. It must show not
only that no alternatives presently exist, but also that such alternative
facilities cannot practically or reasonably be duplicated. 45
In economic terms and in the eyes of the courts, an alternative is
not necessarily infeasible because it is more expensive. 146 Perhaps
more importantly, the fact that access to a facility is more economical
is not sufficient to demonstrate that a given facility is "essential,"'1 47
nor is the fact that a competitor could achieve savings (and hence in-
creased profits) at the expense of the vertically integrated firm.148
The Alaska Airlines case adhered to an economically sound stan-
dard of essentiality; to be "essential," the control of a facility must
enable the owner to eliminate, not merely impede, competition. 149 In-
terestingly, the Alaska Airlines court ruled that the control of a facility
that merely enables the owner to gain a monetary profit at its rival's
expense is not actionable under the antitrust laws as causing injury to
competition,15 0 and that for a facility to be essential, the elimination of
141. See Larson et al., Competitive Access, supra note 103 for further discussion of this
criterion for essentiality.
142. 843 F.2d 1024, 1034 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988).
143. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 736.2, at 721
(1989 Supp.).
144. Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990).
145. Id. at 570.
146. Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 717 F. Supp. 1528, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (a
facility is not essential where "construction of [the upstream market's fuel] storage tanks
and pipelines is expensive. But, as both parties note, the [downstream South Florida
bunker fuel] market is burgeoning and potentially lucrative .... The potential economic
gains to be reaped from an investment are substantial.").
147. Florida Cities v. Florida Power & Light Co., 525 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (S.D. Fla.
1981).
148. City of Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992).
149. Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503
U.S. 977 (1992).
150. Id. at 546.
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competition caused by denial of access to the facility must be "rela-
tively permanent.' 1 51
If unbundling is implemented to foster competition, the un-
bundling should be confined to true "essential facilities." However,
both observed and planned entry into telephone markets indicate that
the set of truly "essential facilities" is either quite small or perhaps
even the null set. Both technical trials now being conducted by cable
companies and actual entry so far indicate that components of tele-
phone service, such as local switching and loops (i.e., the circuit con-
necting a subscriber to the telephone network) are reasonably capable
of being duplicated by some entrants. In fact, technical trials indicate
that in the future it may be possible to offer telephony over cable net-
works without involving telephone companies at all.
Thus, the U.S. local service market experience so far shows that
the proper definition of the term "essential facility" for public policy
purposes is far more restrictive than the complete set of services, facil-
ities, features, or functionalities that only an RBOC or some other
LEC can supply. And in the future, if not now, there may be no true
essential facilities required for competition to take place.
G. Policies Based on Market Share Data Should Be Avoided
For basic residential local exchange service, the LEC usually
serves a very large share of the users. This large market share is often
cited as "proof" that LECs have market power and that the local ex-
change is not yet subject to competitive pressures. 152
However, economists, antitrust scholars, and the courts well
know that market share data are generally unreliable as a means of
assessing market power within a properly defined market, especially a
market that is or was regulated.153 Despite this agreement, regula-
tions have been proposed which require LECs to lose a prespecified
amount of the local exchange market before they can be considered
151. Id. at 544 n. l.
152. See Cramer, supra note 62, at 281-82 ("[T]he local exchange market for telephone
service in the U.S. was $90 billion in 1992, of which the [competitive access providers] had
1992 revenues of $260 million. Their market share was 0.3 percent. This suggests that the
competitive threat is weak.").
153. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); see also Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. New Vector
Comms., Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Reliance on statistical market share in cases
involving regulated industries is at best a tricky enterprise and is downright folly where, as
here, the predominant market share is the result of regulation. In such cases, the court
should focus directly on the regulated firm's ability to control prices or exclude
competition.").
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presumptively "competitive" and hence subject to reduced regulatory
or MFJ oversight. 154
If the potential for entry into telephone markets prevents the ex-
ercise of market power by an LEC (in the absence of public utility
regulation), then this impediment is just one more example of why
market power is the key to assessing the need for regulation in a tele-
communications market and why high market shares of LECs in local
exchange markets are unreliable as the primary measure of market
power. Policies which require an LEC to lose a prespecified level of
market share are pointless. In the near future, if not now, the pros-
pect of entry into telephony mutes any market power an LEC may
have (absent regulation) in the local exchange.
VI
Summary of Policy Recommendations
1. The prospect of entry into local exchange markets makes it neces-
sary to re-evaluate the MFJ's existing line-of-business restrictions.
2. State regulatory policies designed to foster competition should ad-
dress potential entry barriers in conformity with the mainstream
economic definition.
3. Equal pricing flexibility for all market suppliers is an essential pol-
icy as entry into local exchange markets occurs.
4. Regulation should be modified both before and as actual and po-
tential competitors enter the market.
5. Efficient optional multipart tariffs should be allowed in LEC local
service pricing.
6. Proposed comprehensive unbundling is not necessary to encourage
entry into local telecommunications markets.
7. Market share data should be avoided in formulating policy.
154. This is a common argument raised by interexchange carriers. However, the eco-
nomic folly of this argument has been recognized by Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attor-
ney General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, who has rejected the
idea that the RBOCs must lose a significant share of the local exchange market before
being allowed into the interLATA long distance business (an activity proscribed by the
MFJ's line-6f-business restrictions). See Bingaman Speech, supra note 4, at 15 ("At one
extreme is the idea that the Bell Companies should not be allowed to foray into other
markets, such as long distance, until after they experience enormous losses of market share
in the local markets over which they now exercise monopoly control. This approach, how-
ever, could sacrifice for too many years any benefits in added competition and innovation
that the RBOCs might be able to bring to the long distance and other markets."); see also
Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Plans More Phone Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at
D2; Viveca Novak & Daniel Pearl, Bells Get Boost in Bid to Offer Long Distance, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 1, 1995, at A3.
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VII
Future Policy Research
The topic of entry into local exchange markets is quite broad,
encompassing several other important related issues in addition to
those discussed in this article. These issues include: (1) how socially
optimal prices for interconnection to LEC networks should be deter-
mined; (2) the implications of entry into markets in which the incum-
bent's service (but not that of the entrant) must be subsidized, thereby
necessitating a reevaluation of the complex system of support flows
(e.g., the Universal Service Fund, Long Term Support, "Yellow Pages"
imputation, etc.) designed to foster universal service; (3) how an inte-
grated firm offering both cable TV and telephony should be regulated;
or (4) the economics of mutual compensation. These and related is-
sues are fertile areas for future policy research in telecommunications.
